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Supplier Tactics for Dealing with Financially 
Distressed Corporate Customers 
John A. Pearce II* and Ilya A. Lipin** 
I. THE SUPPLIERS’ FINANCIAL PREDICAMENT
When a corporation declares bankruptcy, its suppliers often suffer 
severe economic losses.  These losses result when the bankrupt firm: (1) 
fails to honor its contractual obligations to its supplier,1 (2) gains 
permission to modify its contract with its supplier,2 (3) refuses to pay its 
supplier, (4) rejects its supplier’s request for reclamation of goods, (5) 
forces the supplier to finance the bankruptcy restructuring,3 (6) repudiates a 
prepayment plan to a supplier,4 or (7) enforces a supplier’s obligations 
under the contract during the bankruptcy. 
In all of these situations, the profitability of a supplier suffers when 
accounts receivable become uncollectible or when goods become 
unrecoverable due to a customer’s bankruptcy.5 
* John A. Pearce II, Ph.D., is the VSB Endowed Chair in Strategic Management and
Entrepreneurship and Professor of Management, Villanova School of Business, Villanova University. 
Pennsylvania State University, Ph.D.; University of Pittsburgh, M.B.A.; Ohio University, B.B.A.  Dr. 
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       **  Ilya A. Lipin, J.D., LL.M., MBA is a licensed practicing attorney in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
and Massachusetts.  Mr. Lipin received his LL.M. in Trial Advocacy from Temple University School of 
Law, M.B.A. from Villanova School of Business in 2010, LL.M. in Taxation from Villanova School of 
Law in 2008, J.D. from Thomas M. Cooley Law School in 2006, and B.A. from Drew University in 
2003.  Mr. Lipin may be reached at ilya.a.lipin@gmail.com. 
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The recession that began in December 2007 led to thousands of 
corporate bankruptcies.  According to the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts, there were 43,546 bankruptcy filings involving business debts in 
2008, a fifty-four percent increase over 2007.6  The filings from July 1, 
2008, through June 30, 2009, show 55,021 business bankruptcies, which is 
a sixty-three percent increase over the prior year.7  Boscov’s, Linens-n-
Things, Eddie Bauer, Sharper Image, Steve & Barry’s, KB Toys, Circuit 
City, and Bombay Co. are just few of the well-known businesses that filed 
for bankruptcy protection in the first nineteen months of the recession. 
The bankruptcy of suppliers following the financial failures of large 
corporations is exemplified by the United States automobile manufacturing 
industry.  In the first nine month of 2009 alone, there were forty-seven 
bankruptcy filings of principal suppliers to the automobile industry, after 
the bankruptcies of General Motors and Chrysler,8 and the financial 
difficulties of Ford Motor.9  The largest of these companies, all with recent 
annual revenues in excess of $1 billion, are Lear, Visteon, Smurfit-Stone 
Container, Cooper-Standard Holdings, Hayes Lemmerz, Metaldyne, and 
Mark IV Dayco Products.10 
The damaging effects of the 2007-2009 recession lingered into late 
201111 and business bankruptcy rates continued to rise.  From July 1, 2009, 
through June 30, 2010, there were 59,608 business bankruptcy filings, an 
increase of 8.3% from the prior year.12  Failures to meet corporate 
obligations are predicted to rise by 2014,13 setting off a new wave of 
insolvency of a third party business partner”). 
6. U.S. Courts Bankruptcy Statistics, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/Bankruptcystatistics.aspx
(last visited Mar. 24, 2012). 
7. Id. 
8. See Neil King Jr. & Sharon Terlep, GM Collapses into Government’s Arms, WALL ST. J., Jun.
2, 2009, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124385428627671889.html (approximating 
that the bailout of GM and Chrysler LLC cost the taxpayers more than $62 billion). 
9. See Restoring Credit to Manufacturers: Testimony of the Motor & Equipment Manufacturers
Association Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Economic Policy 
Subcomm., 110th Cong. 1 (2009), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction 
=Files.View&FileStore_id=e4610997-7941-4358-8b4b-1b4c89c7e42c. 
10. See BILL CANIS & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RES. SERVICE, R41151, THE U.S. MOTOR 
VEHICLE INDUSTRY: CONFRONTING A NEW DYNAMIC IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2010), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41154.pdf (stating that “[i]t is estimated that as many as 200 other 
suppliers liquidated their operations in 2009”). 
11. Motoko Rich, Feeble Job Numbers Show Recovery Starting to Stall, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2011,
at A1 (referencing economic data and stating that “economic recovery is stumbling”). See also Dan 
Shingler, Manufacturers Still Skeptical, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS., Jan. 18, 2010, at 1 (referencing 
fears of double dip recession and its effect on suppliers). 
12. See U.S. Courts Bankruptcy Statistics, supra note 6. 
13. See Michael J. de la Merced, A Forecast of a Lower Rate for Defaults, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2011, at B10 (noting predictions that corporate default rates will rise by 2014). 
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financial pressures on suppliers and their business customers.  Thus, 
suppliers will benefit from being proactive in their use of legal tools to 
increase the probability of collecting receivables from their customers.14 
After a company declares bankruptcy, its suppliers are forced into the 
position of trying to recover payments that are legally owed to them.  For 
example, in November of 2008, Circuit City filed for bankruptcy 
protection.  The bankruptcy documents show that Circuit City owed $650 
million to suppliers, with electronics manufacturers Sony, Zenith, Toshiba, 
Garmin, and Nikon among the creditors.15  Circuit City also owed $119 
million to Hewlett-Packard, and $116 million to Samsung Electronics.16 
When bankruptcy causes liquidation of the company, creditors usually 
recover only a portion of the original amount owed to them, if anything. 
For instance, in KB Toys 2008 bankruptcy, unsecured creditors expected to 
receive less than $0.10 on the dollar of what they were owed 
contractually.17  In the 2009 liquidation of Copia, the liquidation plan 
provided unsecured creditors with only $0.13 on the dollar and secured 
creditors, such as bondholders, only received partial recovery proceeds.18  
Similarly, Chrysler’s 2009 bankruptcy was financially devastating for the 
bondholders who were owed $6.9 billion by the carmaker, but collected 
only $0.29 on the dollar under the Chapter 11 agreement.19 
Such large corporate failures can lead to hundreds of tier-2 supplier 
bankruptcies.20  Financial problems of large automotive companies had a 
14. See Melinda Vajdic, A Shrinking Supply Chain, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUS., Dec. 6, 2010, at 22
(suggesting suppliers begin “honing [in] strategies to become flexible and innovative enough to deal 
with whatever their mega-clients dish out next”). 
15. Mark Clothier & Dawn McCarty, Circuit City, Electronics Retailer, Seeks Bankruptcy,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 10, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=aXeltuiAOyzs&pid=2060 
1087. 
16. Id. 
17. Peg Brickley, KB Toys Faces Liquidation, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB122901585422798605.html. 
18. Steve Hart, Judge to Review Objections to Copia Liquidation, PRESS DEMOCRAT, Aug. 14,
2009, available at http://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/20090814/business/908149919?Title=Judge-
to-review-objections-to-Copia-liquidation.  Copia is also known as the American Center for Wine, Food 
and the Arts. 
19. Marie Leone, How Chrysler Spruced Up Bankruptcy, CFO.COM (Aug. 7, 2009), 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14201952/c_14200417. 
20. Direct suppliers of parts to an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) are tier-1 suppliers.
Suppliers that provide parts or components to tier-1 suppliers, to combine, repackage, or to simply 
forward to OEMs, are tier-2 suppliers.  See Leigh Lones, Increasing Liquidity in the Automotive Supply 
Chain, COMM. FACTOR, 10, (Spring 2011) (stating that “Tier One suppliers provide full design, 
assembly and engineering support. They sell finished components, such as transmissions, seats and 
instrument panels, directly to car companies, known in the industry as Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs). Tier One is comprised mostly of large companies such as Delphi or Johnson 
Controls. Tier Two companies mostly sell products to Tier One. An example of a typical Tier Two 
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devastating impact on their suppliers, and on their second tier suppliers.21  
For instance, Visteon, a former division of Ford, was one of the largest auto 
suppliers that filed for bankruptcy protection after the production cutbacks 
by Chrysler and General Motors eroded its financial stability.22  Visteon 
stated that its failure would have a ripple effect and put a financial strain on 
many of its suppliers.23 
Unable to collect from automotive companies such as General Motors, 
many suppliers nearly have burned through their cash reserves.24  Banks are 
retreating from auto-industry lending and private lenders are refusing to 
increase credit for many shaky parts makers due to risks.25  The Obama 
administration responded by establishing a $5-billion fund to assist 
struggling automotive suppliers through the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(“TARP”).  The terms of the program stated the General Motors was to 
receive $2 billion and Chrysler $1.5 billion.26  Further, each company had 
to contribute an amount equal to five percent of their receipts and if 
necessary could access the remaining $1.5 billion at a later date.27  The 
benefit of the program was to guarantee that suppliers would be paid for 
their deliveries without additional wait for payments, thus restoring the 
flow of credit in a critical sector that employs more than 500,000 American 
workers.28  However, the program was criticized because it permitted 
General Motors and Chrysler to decide which suppliers would benefit from 
the program and receive the payments.  Thus, some suppliers may not 
receive any payments from the program that was designed to help them. 
As a result, very little of the set aside money benefited the industry’s 
company would be one that supplies component parts, such as transmission gears, electronics, 
speedometers and seat covers, to the Tier One suppliers. Tier Three suppliers generally provide smaller 
components and some tooling and dies to Tier Two companies. In practice, they sell to both Tier One 
and Tier Two.”). 
21. Society of Automotive Analysts, SAA Analysts Warn of Increased Supplier, Bankruptcies,
Further Image Damage in Wake of Chrysler Bankruptcy, REUTERS (May 1, 2009), http://www. 
reuters.com/article/2009/05/01/idUS152206+01-May-2009+PRN20090501. 
22. Jeffrey McCracken & Andrew Grossman, Auto Supplier Visteon Plans Chapter 11 Filing in
U.S., WALL ST. J., May 28, 2009, at B1.  At the end of 2008, Visteon employed 11,000 salaried workers
and 22,500 hourly workers world-wide.  The company also had $893 million in unfunded pension
obligations. 
23. Martha Graybow & Jessica Hall, Visteon Gets Bankruptcy Court OK to Pay Wages, REUTERS
(May 29, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSTRE54S56W20090529.
24. Rick Barrett, For GM Suppliers, Struggles Remain, JOURNAL SENTINEL (July 10, 2009),
available at http://www.jsonline.com/business/50505737.html. 
25. Jesse Snyder, Supplier Woes Will Worsen Before They Improve, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Aug. 3,
2009, at 12A. 
26. Nick Bunkley, Aid Program for Suppliers Starts With $3.5 Billion in Loans to G.M. and
Chrysler, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009, at B4. 
27. Id. 
28. Bunkley, supra note 26, at B4.
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suppliers.29 
This article consists of seven parts.  Part I provides an introduction 
and explanation as to how customers’ financial distress and bankruptcy can 
affect suppliers’ ability to obtain full payment for goods sold.  Part II 
describes how the Bankruptcy Code is relevant to suppliers and how 
customers faced with an inability to pay their obligations as they become 
due use it to gain an advantage over their suppliers.  Part III offers an 
extensive discussion of the supplier remedies under BAPCPA, such as 
reclamation and administrative priority status, while Part IV details the 
remedies available to suppliers under state law. Tactics that may improve 
the leverage of the supplier when dealing with the financially distressed 
customers are proposed in Part V.  Part VI suggests innovative methods to 
receive full payment from customers.  Lastly, Part VII discusses unsettled 
issues of importance to suppliers that remain after the enactment of 
BAPCPA. 
II. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE’S RELEVANCE TO SUPPLIERS
The Bankruptcy Code provides for two types of bankruptcies that 
most often have consequences for creditors, including suppliers: Chapter 7 
and Chapter 11.30 
A case under Chapter 7 is one of liquidation.31  The goal of Chapter 7 
is to provide debtors with the opportunity for a “fresh start” by discharging 
most of their debts, and to provide for the equitable distribution of debtor’s 
non-exempt assets among the creditors, which include the suppliers.  Since 
the corporate debtor cannot receive a discharge under Chapter 7, the goal is 
to provide for liquidation and distribution of debtor’s corporate assets to its 
suppliers.32  In liquidation, the bankruptcy trustee administers the case, 
liquidates all the nonexempt assets, and distributes the proceeds from the 
29. Brian Albright, OEM Bankruptcies Hinder Parts Availability, AFTERMARKET BUS., Aug. 1, 
2009, at 36. 
30. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) (2006). (“The term ‘creditor’ means: (A) entity that has a claim against
the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor;  (B) entity that 
has a claim against the estate of a kind specified in § 348(d), § 502(f), § 502(g), § 502(h) or § 502(i) of 
the bankruptcy code; or  (C) entity that has a community claim.”).  See id. § 101(13) (“The term 
‘debtor’ means person or municipality concerning which a case under bankruptcy code has been 
commenced.”).  See id. § 101(15) (“The term ‘entity’ includes person, estate, trust, governmental unit, 
and United States trustee.”). 
31. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (2006). See 2 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER
BANKRUPTCY MANUAL P 700.01 (Matthew Bender, 3d ed. rev. 2009) (stating that “[l]iquidation is a 
form of relief afforded by the bankruptcy laws that involves the collection, liquidation and distribution 
of the nonexempt property of the debtor and culminates in the discharge of the liquidation debtor”). 
32. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (2006).
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liquidation in accordance with priority status of liens and bankruptcy law. 
For suppliers at the bottom of the priority list this means receiving pennies 
on the dollar.  Filing of Chapter 7 also means stay of collection actions 
against the debtor or debtor’s property.33  During the automatic stay, or 
until it is lifted by the bankruptcy court, the suppliers may not initiate or 
continue lawsuits to collect moneys due. 
A case under Chapter 11 is one of reorganization and is primarily 
focused on business debtors.34  The bankruptcy petition may be filed 
voluntary by the debtor or forced on the firm by its creditors, which include 
suppliers.35  Under Chapter 11, the debtor continues to operate its business 
as a debtor in possession (“DIP”)36 and is placed in the position of a 
fiduciary with rights and powers of the Chapter 11 trustee.37  The hallmark 
of Chapter 11 is flexibility, where the DIP is offered a considerable 
discretion in the operation of its business,38 in exchange for entering into a 
contractual plan with suppliers regarding repayment of debt.  Under the 
plan, suppliers are compensated pursuant to the terms either negotiated 
with other creditors or imposed by the court.  The plan presents an 
opportunity for restructuring the business with the goal to preserve jobs, 
pay suppliers, and reduce the disturbance that can result from termination 
of a business.39 
The filing of a Chapter 11 case causes all of the debtor’s property to 
become property of the bankruptcy estate.40  Again, after filing, the 
automatic stay protects the debtor and debtor’s property from collections of 
prepetition claims.41  This means that suppliers may not collect their pre-
petition dues from the DIP, unless they get the permission of the 
bankruptcy court which may lift or modify the automatic stay. 
In addition, filing under Chapter 11 provides DIP with various 
powers.  The DIP has the power to use, sell, or lease property of the 
33. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).  See id. § 362(b) for exceptions to automatic stay. 
34. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (2006).  See  RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 31, at 1101.01. 
35. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (2006). 
36. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2006).  See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2006), which allows the court to appoint a
trustee other than DIP. 
37. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2006).  See 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(2)–(4) (2006) for exclusions and exceptions 
relating to investigatory powers. 
38. RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 31, at 1100.01 (noting that “[t]he hallmark of chapter 11 is
flexibility. The debtor in possession is offered considerable discretion in the operation of the business, 
constrained generally only by a business judgment rule”). 
39. Id. 
40. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006).  See 11 U.S.C § 541(b) (2006) for property excluded from the
definition. 
41. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006). 
  
Summer 2012 SUPPLIER TACTICS 411 
estate,42 but is required to provide adequate protection to entities with 
interests in the property.43  The DIP may obtain financing for post-petition 
operations, which may include entering into new agreements where liens 
will take priority over preexisting obligations.44  The DIP also has the 
power to assume or reject contracts and leases.45  The rejection of an 
executory contract leaves the supplier with various state law remedies, 
which are hard to enforce against an insolvent buyer.  If the trustee assumes 
the contact, then the supplier will have to perform in accordance with the 
terms of the agreement.46  For suppliers these Chapter 11 provisions mean 
that the DIP may change or break their contracts, change the supplier’s pre-
petition priority status, continue to use supplier’s property throughout the 
bankruptcy, and risk never being compensated for goods sold. 
III. SUPPLIER REMEDIES UNDER BAPCPA
In October 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act (“BAPCPA”) was enacted to amend the Bankruptcy Code. 
The BAPCPA provides additional remedies for the creditor-supplier under 
sections 503(b)(9) and 546(c) that did not exist under the prior law.  To 
minimize the economic harm caused by customer’s bankruptcy, an unpaid 
supplier must assert certain rights provided by the BAPCPA. 
A. RECLAMATION
Reclamation is the right of a seller to recover possession of goods
delivered to an insolvent buyer.47  The BAPCPA has significantly extended 
the reclamation period for goods that were shipped to a bankrupt debtor. 
42. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006).  See also RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 31, at 1100.01 (stating that
“[t]he debtor in possession is given the ability to use, sell, or lease property of the estate, even if the 
property is subject to the interest of another entity, and even if this interest is a lien or security interest 
which would follow proceeds under applicable nonbankruptcy law”). 
43. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2006). 
44. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2006). 
45. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2006).  See RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 34, at 1101.01 (noting that
“[t]he debtor in possession may also rationalize its business through the assumption or rejection of 
executory contracts or leases; by assumption, the estate becomes fully liable for any pre-petition 
contracts, and by rejection the estate breaches the contract and may treat the damages as arising 
prepetition”). 
46. In re R. F. Cunningham & Co., 2006 WL 3791329, at 3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006).  The trustee
in this situation has to ensure that buyer performs in accordance with the contract by making the 
required payments to the supplier. At the consummation of the deal, the supplier will remove itself from 
the insolvency proceeding because the supplier obtained payments and is no longer affected by either 
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcies.  Id. 
47. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 414 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
  
412 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 8:2 
Prior to BAPCPA, suppliers relied on the Uniform Commercial Code 
(“UCC”) for remedies pertaining to shipment of goods to a bankrupt 
debtor.  Suppliers specifically depended on section 2-702, which allowed 
them to stop shipment or reclaim goods shipped within ten days of insolvency.48 
Reclamation under BAPCPA’s section 546(c) does not preclude 
supplier to pursue other nonbankruptcy remedies.49  Under section 546(c) 
suppliers have forty-five days to reclaim goods that they have sold and 
shipped in their ordinary course of business to a bankrupt debtor.50  The 
reclamation demand must be made in writing within forty-five days of the 
receipt of goods.51  However, if the forty-five day period has not expired as 
of the filing of the bankruptcy case, the supplier will have an additional 
twenty days to demand reclamation after the bankruptcy filing date.52  As a 
result of section 546(c), a supplier now has the ability to reclaim goods up 
to forty-five days’ worth of shipments, if not paid for and in the possession 
of the debtor, in contrast to ten days’ worth.53  This section of BAPCPA is 
particularly beneficial to suppliers who ship products that turn over at a 
48. U.C.C. § 2-702 (West 2012). 
49. The non-bankruptcy remedies may be subjected to the trustee’s avoidance powers and
automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).  The seller may stop goods in transit.  See In re Nat’l Sugar 
Refining Co., 27 B.R. 565, 568 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that “[w]hen the buyer is insolvent and 
thus impaired in fulfilling its contractual obligation to pay, the seller rather than deliver the goods and 
seek to recover on the price . . . may withhold or stop in transit the delivery of the goods—i.e., suspend 
his performance”); In re Fabric Buys, 34 B.R. 471, 475 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that a “buyer’s 
attempt to receive goods on credit while insolvent renders the sale voidable and triggers the seller’s 
right to stop the goods in transit”); In re Marin Motor Oil, Inc., 740 F.2d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(noting that the right to stop goods in transit is considered to be a “different right”); In re Mayer Pollack 
Steel Corp., 157 B.R. 952, 960 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (noting that “[c]aselaw precedents, as well as the 
terms of 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(2), clearly indicate that the right to reclamation is not absolute.  Thus, 
where a seller’s right to reclamation is superseded by the superior rights of a secured creditor or where 
the goods have been sold to a good faith purchaser before the reclamation demand is received, the seller 
may be awarded, at the court’s discretion, either an administrative claim or a lien.”). 
50. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (2006). This provision of the bankruptcy code states that: “(1) Except 
as provided in subsection (d) of this section and in § 507(c), and subject to the prior rights of a holder of 
a security interest in such goods or the proceeds thereof, the rights and powers of the trustee under §§ 
544(a), 545, 547, and 549 are subject to the right of a seller of goods that has sold goods to the debtor, 
in the ordinary course of such seller’s business, to reclaim such goods if the debtor has received such 
goods while insolvent, within 45 days before the date of the commencement of a case under this title, 
but such seller may not reclaim such goods unless such seller demands in writing reclamation of such 
goods: (A) not later than 45 days after the date of receipt of such goods by the debtor; or (B) not later 
than 20 days after the date of commencement of the case, if the 45-day period expires after the 
commencement of the case. (2) If a seller of goods fails to provide notice in the manner described in 
paragraph (1), the seller still may assert the rights contained in § 503(b)(9).”  Id. 
51. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (2006). 
52. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
53. Lynne Xerras, BAPCPA Spells Relief For Certain Trade Creditors in Chapter 11, 7
BANKRUPTCY AND CREDITORS’ RIGHTS 2 (2006). 
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slow rate.54 
Suppliers must be aware of the law surrounding reclamation in 
bankruptcy.  A timely written demand must be made even if the debtor has 
made misrepresentations regarding its solvency.55  This demand must be an 
explicit desire to reclaim goods,56 and must be made by the seller and not 
third parties.57  The condition and location of goods is also important.  The 
seller must identify the goods sought in debtor’s possession.58  Goods that 
were converted into a finished product may not be reclaimed.59  Further, 
reclamation does not apply to proceeds.60  Thus, if supplier’s widgets were 
installed into a car of an insolvent automobile manufacturer, the supplier 
does not have a reclamation rights as to the widgets installed or to the 
proceeds. 
1. In re Advanced Marketing Services Inc.
Under BAPCPA, the supplier’s legal right to reclamation of goods is
subject to floating and post-petition liens.61  The statutory language of 
section 546(c) expressly makes reclamation rights “subject to the prior 
rights of a holder of a security interest in the goods or the proceeds 
thereof.”62 
54. Xerras, supra note 53, at 2. 
55. RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 31, at 546.04.  See Oakland Gin Co. v. Marlow (In re Julien
Co.), 44 F.3d 426, 432 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting the use of the demand); In re Marin Motor Oil, Inc., 740 
F.2d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that “Section 546(c) unambiguously provides that the seller may
not reclaim goods from the trustee in bankruptcy unless he first “demands in writing reclamation of
such goods before ten days after receipt of such goods by the debtor”). 
56. In re Marin Motor Oil, Inc., 740 F.2d 220, at 224. See In Re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp.
840, 844 (W.D. Va. 1968) (where the court held that simply demanding payment for goods did not 
constitute a written demand for reclamation). 
57. In re Julien Co., 44 F.3d 426, 432, n.4 (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 546 “clearly states that the
‘seller’ must make the written demand, not a warehouseman or bailee of the seller”). 
58. RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 31, at 546.04 (stating that “[t]he seller must establish that the
goods to be reclaimed are in the debtor’s possession when reclamation was sought, and the goods must 
be identifiable”). 
59. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 74 B.R. 656, 658 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987) (noting that
“fungible goods may be reclaimed if the seller can trace the goods from its possession into an 
identifiable mass that contains goods of like kind and grade”). 
60. In re MGS Mktg., 111 B.R. 264, 267 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Cal. 1990). 
61. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (2007).  See In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores Inc., 302 B.R. 128, 134
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that “[w]hile, the right to reclamation is subordinate to that of a good 
faith purchaser, it is not automatically extinguished”); Auto Auction Assocs. of Mont., Inc. v. Incredible 
Auto Sales LLC (In re Incredible Auto Sales LLC), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024 (Bankr. D Mont. Mar. 26, 
2007); In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 418 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
62. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (2007). See Xerras, supra note 53, at 213 (noting that the “language
essentially eliminates any ability of a vendor to challenge that a lender is not a ‘good-faith’ purchaser as 
that term is used in Article 2-702 of the Uniform Commercial Code such that the rights of an under-
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The provisions of section 546(c) were first interpreted in Advanced 
Marketing Services Inc. (“AMS”) Chapter 11 case.63  The insolvent buyer, 
AMS, was a wholesaler of general interest goods to membership warehouse 
clubs, certain specialty retailers, e-commerce companies, traditional 
bookstores and bookstore chains.64  Simon & Schuster, Inc. (“S&S”) was 
one of the largest third-party publishers from whom AMS acquired books.65 
The same day AMS filed for bankruptcy, S&S sent a reclamation 
demand to AMS.66  Thereafter, S&S filed a complaint seeking to reclaim 
approximately $5 million in goods67 and a motion for a temporary 
restraining order (“TRO”).68  At the time of the TRO hearing, 
approximately $800,000 of inventory subject to S&S’s reclamation claim 
remained in AMS’s possession.69 
S&S was trying to reclaim goods that were subject to both pre- and 
post-petition liens established to the same lender.70  S&S was a party to pre-
petition Loan and Security Agreement entered into in 2004 (“Senior 
Facility”), where Wells Fargo Foothill, Inc. (“Foothill”) was an agent for 
the lenders (“Senior Lenders”).71  The Senior Facility was an asset-based 
lending agreement, which provided for a revolving line of credit 
(“Revolving Loans”) up to $90-million maximum commitment.72  AMS’s 
obligations under the Senior Facility were secured by a floating lien on 
secured lender to assert a lien in the goods sold by the vendor are superior”).  See In re Reliable Drug 
Stores, Inc., 70 F.3d 948, 950 (7th Cir. Ind. 1995) (noting that “[a] reclamation claim is ‘subject to’ the 
interests of good faith purchasers”). 
63. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Advanced Mktg. Servs. (In re Advanced Mktg. Servs.), 360 B.R.
421, 421 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007). 
64. Advanced Mktg. Servs. 360 B.R. at 424 (noting that the warehouse clubs included Costco
Wholesale Corporation, SAM’s Club, and BJ’s Wholesale Club). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. AMS filed voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on
December 29, 2006.  That same day, S&S sent a reclamation demand to AMS. Id. 
67. Id. The Complaint for Reclamation of Goods Pursuant to § 546(c) and Related Relief
(“Complaint”) filed on January 5, 2007, sought (i) reclamation of goods in aggregate amount of 
approximately $5 million that S&S alleges were received pre-petition by AMS (the “Goods”), (ii) 
immediate payment to S&S of certain administrative expense claims, and (iii) accounting of the Goods. 
Id. 
68. Id. at 424. (noting that the motion for TRO filed on January 11, 2007, sought an order directing
AMS (i) to stop selling the Goods, (ii) to segregate the Goods from any other inventory in AMS’s 
possession, (iii) to provide S&S with an accounting of Goods, and (iv) to provide S&S access to the 
Goods for inspection). 
69. Id.  The TRO hearing was held on January 17, 2007. Order denying TRO was issued on
January 22, 2007.  Id. 
70. Id. at 426.
71. Id. at 424.
72. Id.  The availability of Senior Facility was determined by a formula based upon AMS’s
accounts receivable and inventory subject to adjustment and reserves established by Foothill and Senior 
Lenders. Id. 
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substantially all of its assets, including inventory.73  This means that Senior 
Lenders’ first priority security interest extended to the Goods that S&S 
desires to reclaim. 
There were numerous restrictions on AMS’s ability to access their 
cash since virtually all of the AMS’s cash from operations was swept daily 
into an account controlled by Foothill and applied to outstanding loans, and 
then re-advanced as loans in accordance with the borrowing formula.74  At 
the time of the bankruptcy petition, the principal amount for Revolving 
Loans exceeded $41.5 million.75  On the date of the bankruptcy petition, 
AMS sought an interim order for post-petition financing, which the Court 
granted (the “Interim DIP Order”).76  Pursuant to this order, AMS was able 
to continue to receive financing from Foothill and other Senior Lenders, 
including cash advanced and other extensions of credit, but in an aggregate 
principal amount of $75 million (the “DIP Loan”).77  The terms of the post-
petition agreement did not extinguish AMS’s obligations under the Senior 
Facility or discharge any related security interests.78 
The court denied S&S’s application for a TRO.79  The Court found 
that (1) goods S&S attempted to reclaim were subject to prior secured liens, 
(2) S&S was unable to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of its
reclamation claim, (3) S&S failed to establish the existence of any
irreparable harm, and (4) S&S failed to establish the balance of equities to
support granting of an injunction.80  In particular, the Court stated that the
goods S&S supplied to AMS became subject to pre-petition and post-
73. Advanced Mktg. Servs. 360 B.R. at 424. 
74. Id. at 424–25. 
75. Id. at 424.  Senior Lenders assert and the Debtors have agreed that as of the Petition Date the
Debtors were obligated to the Senior Lenders for the principal amount drawn on Revolving Loans plus 
accrued and unpaid interest and certain additional unpaid fees in an amount not less than 
$41,514,347.58.  Id. 
76. Id. at 425 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007).
77. Id. 
78. Id. (noting that the DIP Loan was secured by a lien on all of the AMS’s pre-petition, present
and future assets. This DIP Loan was senior to all other liens other than validly perfected Pre-Petition 
Liens.  Senior Lenders were granted a superpriority administrative expense claim senior to all other 
administrative claims.  Further, the DIP Loan Agreement provided that Pre-Petition Liens granted to the 
Senior Lenders continue in full force and effect, and secure repayment of all obligations owed to the 
lenders under the DIP Loan Agreement.). 
79. In issuing its decision, the Court followed the temporary restraining order (“TRO”) standard
prescribed in Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290 
F.3d 578, 586 (3d Cir. 2002).  In order to issue TRO, the Court must be convinced that the following
factors are met: “(1) the likelihood that the moving party will succeed on the merits; (2) the extent to
which the moving party will suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief; (3) the extent to which
the nonmoving party will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is issued; and (4) the public interest.”
Id. 
80. Advanced Mktg. Servs., 360 B.R. at 429. 
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petition liens and claims.81  The Court relied on section 546(c) which states 
that the supplier’s rights are “subject to the prior rights of a holder of a 
security interest in such goods or proceeds thereof.”82  Accordingly, the 
Court held that Senior Lenders’ pre-petition and post-petition liens on the 
AMS’s inventory are superior to S&S’s reclamation claim.83 
2. In re Dana Corp.
Another bankruptcy court provided further interpretation and
application of section 546(c) in In re Dana Corp.84  Dana Corporation 
(“Dana”) and its non-debtor affiliates (“Dana Companies”) are 
manufacturers and suppliers of modules, systems and components for 
original equipment manufacturers and service customers in automotive 
industry.85  Dana and its forty domestic direct and indirect subsidiaries 
(“Debtors”) filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11.86  Within a month, the 
Court issued a Reclamation Order establishing procedures for resolving 
reclamation claims.87  Over 450 creditor-suppliers sent letters to the 
Debtors asserting their reclamation rights and demanding return of 
previously shipped goods in an aggregate amount of more than $297 
million.88  In response, the Debtors asserted that reclamation rights are 
subject to superior rights of a security interest holder on the reclamation 
goods (“Prior Lien Defense”), which rendered all of the reclamation rights 
valueless.89 
81. Advanced Mktg. Servs., 360 B.R. at 426. 
82. Id. 
83. Advanced Mktg. Servs., 360 B.R. at 426.  The Court stated that by this reason alone S&S failed
to establish any likelihood of success in establishing a valid reclamation claim under § 546(c).  Id. 
84. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 409 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
85. Id. at 410 (noting that Dana and Dana Companies manufactured and supplied modules, systems
and components for original equipment manufacturers and service customers in cars, vans, sport-utility 
vehicles, trucks, and a wide variety of off highway vehicles. The Dana Companies operated in 
approximately twenty-five states, as well as in Mexico, Canada, eleven countries in Europe and 
fourteen countries elsewhere in the world.  As disclosed in Dana’s Form 10-K filed on April 27, 2006, 
in 2005 the Dana Companies recorded revenue of approximately $8.7 billion and had assets of 
approximately $7.4 billion and liabilities totaling $6.8 billion.). 
86. Id. at 410 (stating that Dana filed bankruptcy on March 3, 2006). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 410–411. 
89. Id. at 411 (stating that in the Debtors’ opinion, the holding of In re Dairy Mart Convenience
Stores Inc., 302 B.R. 128, 134–36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003), language of § 546(c), and the existence of 
prior liens on the reclaimed goods rendered otherwise valid reclamation claims valueless and entitled 
them only to general unsecured claims). 
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Prior to bankruptcy, Dana borrowed money to support its operations 
(“Prepetition Credit Facility”).90  Under the Prepetition Credit Facility 
agreement, each creditor received a security interest in Dana’s equipment, 
inventory, accounts, and certain other current assets.91  When Dana 
declared bankruptcy, borrowings under the Prepetition Credit Facility 
equaled $381 million, while the value of Dana’s assets exceeded the value 
of pre-petition indebtedness.92  On the date of bankruptcy filing, Dana 
entered into interim agreement for post-petition financing that allowed it to 
pay off its prior debts.93  Thereafter, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Final 
DIP order, which approved DIP facility financing.94  The Final DIP Order 
authorized the Debtors to refinance the Prepetition Indebtedness with the 
proceeds of the DIP Facility.95  Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the 
DIP Facility and the Final DIP Order, the Debtors repaid the Prepetition 
Indebtedness in full using funds borrowed under the DIP Facility.96 
In response to the reclamation demands made by suppliers, Dana 
asserted a Prior Lien Defense and claimed that any rights to reclamation of 
goods are worthless.  Further, Dana contended that because the pre-petition 
indebtedness exceeded the value of each individual reclamation claim and 
because goods subject to reclamation claims were disposed as part of the 
transaction to repay the prior claims of lien holders, the reclamation claims 
are valueless.97 
In response to Dana’s assertions, the suppliers filed opposition 
responses claiming the pre-petition secured debt was not paid with the 
proceeds of reclaimed goods, but instead with the proceeds of the DIP 
90. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 412 (noting that under the Prepetition Credit Facility, Dana had
access to $400 million of revolving credit, of which up to a maximum $100 million could be utilized for 
letters of credit). 
91. Id.
92. Id. at 412.
93. Id. at 412–13. (stating that the Interim DIP Order issued by the Bankruptcy Court (1)
authorized Debtor to obtain $1.45 billion in secured post-petition financing, and (2) utilized the pre-
petition lenders cash collateral and grated adequate protections to the pre-petition lenders.  Under the 
DIP Facility and pursuant to the Interim DIP Order, the lenders (the “DIP Lenders”) were granted a 
valid, binding, continuing, enforceable, fully perfected first priority senior priming security interest in 
and lien (the “DIP Lien”) upon all prepetition and post-petition property of the Debtors, whether now 
existing or hereafter acquired, that is subject to the existing liens.  Further, the Interim DIP Order stated 
that there was no cross-collateralization of pre-petition or post-petition liens). 
94. Id. at 413 (noting that the Bankruptcy Court approved “the DIP Facility on a final basis and
authorized the use of the Prepetition Lenders’ cash collateral and the granting of the DIP Lien and the 
Replacement Lien to the DIP Lenders and Prepetition Lenders, respectively.”  Further, the Final DIP 
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Loan.  Suppliers argued that reclamation rights were only subject to a prior 
lien, that pre-petition debt was satisfied from a source other than the 
reclaimed goods, and that the reclaimed goods were liberated from the 
prior lien and reclamation claims must be valued in full.98  In regards to the 
asserted Prior Lien Defense, the suppliers argued that their reclamation 
rights were not extinguished by the existence of prior lien, but only 
rendered subordinate to the prior lien, and that Prepetition Lenders were 
over secured; thus permitting the claimants to recover from any excess 
value.99 
The court held for Dana and stated that the Prior Lien Defense 
asserted by Dana rendered suppliers’ reclamation rights valueless.100  The 
court stated that reclaiming suppliers do not have a right to compel a lien 
holder to satisfy its claim from other collateral.101  Thus, if the value of any 
given reclaiming supplier’s goods does not exceed the amount of debt 
secured by the prior lien, that reclamation claim is valueless.102  The court 
analogized the current case to In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 
which held that sale of goods in satisfaction of pre-petition debt renders all 
reclamation claims for those goods valueless.103 
98. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 413. 
99. Id. at 418.
100. Id. at 421.
101. Id. at 419 (stating that reclamation is an in rem remedy, and reclaiming sellers have no right to
compel a lienholder to satisfy its claim from other collateral).  See Galey & Lord Inc. v. Arley Corp. (In 
re Arlco, Inc.), 239 B.R. 261, 275 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that “a party seeking reclamation . . . 
may not compel the application of marshalling against a good faith purchaser”); Simon & Schuster, Inc. 
v. Advanced Mktg. Servs. (In re Advanced Mktg. Servs.), 360 B.R. 421, 427 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007)
(ruling that “unsecured creditors cannot invoke the equitable doctrine of marshaling”).
102. Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 419. See Yenkin-Majestic Paint Corp. v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
Corp. (In re Pittsburgh-Canfield Corp.), 309 B.R. 277, 287 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
“[r]eclaiming seller is not entitled to administrative expense priority or lien without showing that claim 
has value outside of bankruptcy”); see also In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores Inc., 302 B.R. 128, 
134 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003); Allegiance Healthcare Corp. v. Primary Health Sys. (In re Primary Health 
Sys.), 258 B.R. 111, 117 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001); In re Leeds Bldg. Prods., 141 B.R. 265, 270 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 1992).  See C. RICHARD MCQUEEN & JACK F. WILLIAMS, TAX ASPECTS OF BANKR. L. AND
PRACT., § 7:11 (3d ed. 2006) (stating that “[t]he reality is that, in most cases, asset-based financing
provides a prior perfected lien on most goods such that the right of reclamation is rendered moot”). 
103. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 419 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).  See Dairy Mart Convenience
Stores, Inc., 302 B.R. at 135–136 (“[w]here the claim of a prepetition secured lender with a floating lien 
on inventory is paid out of the proceeds of a post-petition credit facility supported by a new floating lien 
on inventory, the reclaimed goods securing the pre-petition lender’s debt effectively have been disposed 
in satisfaction of that debt. Such a sale of goods in satisfaction of prepetition secured debt renders all 
reclamation claims for those goods valueless.”). 
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3. In re Incredible Auto Sales
In Auto Associates of Montana v. Incredible Auto Sales LLC, a
Montana bankruptcy court resolved a proceeding involving reclamation 
claims against insolvent debtor-seller of used automobiles and provided its 
interpretation of section 546(c).104  The parties to the bankruptcy 
proceeding were insolvent debtor Incredible Auto Sales LLC 
(“Incredible”), reclaiming supplier Auction Associates of Montana, Inc. 
(“AAM”), and Incredible’s floor plan lender Hyundai Motor Finance 
Company (“HMFC”).105 
Incredible was a retail and wholesale dealer of automobiles that 
purchased a number of vehicles from supplier AAM.106 These vehicles 
were sold by AAM and purchased by Incredible in the ordinary course of 
business during the forty-five day period prior to Incredible’s filing for 
bankruptcy.107 Incredible took possession of all the vehicles, displayed 
them on its retail lot, and offered them for sale to customers.108  AAM 
transferred original certificates of title to Incredible for all but one 
vehicle.109  Incredible tendered a payment for several vehicles sold, which 
was returned for insufficient funds.110  Thereafter, Incredible notified AAM 
that it also was unable to pay for the remainder of the vehicles.111 
As Incredible’s floor lender, HMFC held a security interest in all of 
Incredible’s used vehicle inventory.112  The terms of the floor plan stated 
that Incredible had to pay for vehicles with its own funds.113  Upon receipt 
104. Auto Auction Assocs. of Mont., Inc. v. Incredible Auto Sales LLC (In re Incredible Auto Sales
LLC), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024, at *31 (Bankr. D Mont. Mar. 26, 2007). 
105. Incredible Auto Sales LLC, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024, at *2–5 (noting that the Incredible filed
for bankruptcy protection of Chapter 11 on October 17, 2006). 
106. Incredible Auto Sales LLC, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024, at *3. 
107. Id. (noting that AAM sold seven used vehicles to Incredible pre-petition. In early October
2006, Incredible purchased the Subject Vehicles through AAM).  See id. at *6 (stating that “[w]hen 
AAM sold the Subject Vehicles to Incredible, it did so in the ordinary course of business at a time when 
Incredible was insolvent, all of which occurred within forty-five days of the commencement of the 
case”). 
108. Id. at *5.
109. Id. 
110. Id. (noting that tendered checks by Incredible for three cars were returned for insufficient
funds). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at *3–7 (noting that HMFC holds a properly perfected security interest in “[a]ll inventory of
new and used motor vehicles and other personal property held for sale or lease including, but not 
limited to, display or demonstration items, returns and repossessions, and accessories and additions 
thereto.”  HMFC’s security interest is evidenced by Inventory Loan and Security Agreement and three 
financing statements filed with the Montana Secretary of State’s office.). 
113. Id. at *7.
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of vehicles’ certificates of title, Incredible would fax the copies to HMFC, 
which in return would fund the entire purchase for vehicles bought at an 
auction, and eighty percent for vehicles bought directly from the seller.114 
On the same date Incredible filed for bankruptcy, AAM timely filed a 
reclamation claim for vehicles sold to Incredible.115  HMFC asserted that its 
security interest in Incredible’s inventory is superior to AAM’s reclamation 
rights.116  Shortly after the filing for bankruptcy, the court granted a joint 
motion for HMFC and AAM to sell the used vehicles sold by AAM to 
Incredible at the auction to prevent their future deprecation in value and 
thereafter distribute the proceeds in accordance with the court’s decision.117  
The net proceeds from the sale of vehicles were insufficient to pay either 
AAM or HMFC the full amount of their respective claims.118 
The bankruptcy court had to decide who had the security interest in 
the goods, whether that security interest attached, and who was entitled to 
the proceeds of vehicle sale.119  Like the courts in Advanced Marketing 
Services and In re Dana, this court also based its decision on the expressed 
language of section 546(c) which reads “subject to the prior rights of a 
holder of a security interest in such goods or proceeds thereof.”120  This 
bankruptcy court stated that floor plan lenders, like HMFC, are capable of 
possessing pre-petition or post-petition inventory liens and holding superior 
rights to reclamation holders.121 
114. Incredible Auto Sales LLC, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024, at *7. 
115. Id. at *6 (stating that “AAM provided a timely written demand to Incredible for reclamation of
the Subject Vehicles.”). 
116. Id. at *3, *14–15 (noting that in its claims AAM contends (1) its reclamation claims are
superior to HMFC perfected inventory flooring loan; (2) course of performance and course of dealings 
establish that the auction transactions were never completed as full payment was not made so HMFC’s 
security interest could never attach; (3) Incredible’s misconduct, i.e., its knowledge that the proffered 
checks were worthless, prevented Incredible from obtaining rights in the vehicles; (4) that HMFC did 
not act in good faith as HMFC was not merely enforcing its rights but restructuring how it dealt with 
Incredible.  In response, HMFC contends that (1) its inventory flooring loan is superior to AAM’s 
reclamation claims and (2) its security interest attached to the above described vehicles because 
Incredible obtained rights in the vehicles securing its inventory flooring lien.). 
117. Incredible Auto Sales LLC, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024, at *8–9 (Bankr. D Mont. Mar. 26, 2007)
(stating that the parties’ substantive rights were unaffected by the sale of the vehicles.  To the extent 
either party had a right in the vehicles sold, such party now had the rights in the sale proceeds). 
118. Id. at *9.
119. Id. at *20–21 (“[T]he issue becomes whether the debtor has rights in the collateral, as the Court
based on the stipulated facts concludes that value has been given and Debtor has authenticated a 
security agreement describing the collateral. If Incredible . . . has rights in the collateral . . .  then 
[HMFC’s] flooring security interest will be superior to AAM’s reclamation claim”). See Deborah 
Thorne, Reclamation under the New § 546(c)(1): Illusory Remedy as Ever: In re Dana Corp. and 
Incredible Auto Sales LLC, 26 ABI J. 5 (2007). 
120. See Thorne, supra note 119. 
121. Incredible Auto Sales LLC, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024, at *19–20 (Bankr. D Mont. Mar. 26,
2007) (noting that “[f]looring lenders for businesses with perfected security interests in pre and post-
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The court stated that the lender HMFC was entitled to all of the 
proceeds of the vehicles, except one vehicle for which the certificate of title 
was not provided.  The court held for HMFC due to its security interest in 
the vehicles, because AAM delivered titles for the vehicles, and because 
Incredible tendered checks and took possession of the vehicles sold.122  The 
court ruled that HMFC had a security interest that attached to Incredible’s 
inventory, where the certificates of title were delivered.123  This included 
the used vehicles that Incredible purchased from AAM, except for the 
vehicle for which certificate of title was not delivered.124  Thus, HMFC’s 
lien on vehicles for which it received title was superior to reclamation 
claims asserted by AAM.125  As a result, the court stated that AAM was 
entitled to recover the proceeds from the sale of one vehicle for which the 
certificate of title was not provided, while HMFC was entitled to the 
remaining proceeds.126 
4. Practice under New Section 546(c)
The enactment of section 546(c) did not provide the anticipated
expansion of supplier’s rights.  As a matter of practice, section 546(c) has 
not resulted in much benefit to suppliers due to their subordination to prior 
floating and post-petition liens on inventory.127  The bankruptcy court 
decisions in AMS, Dana, and Incredible Auto sales confirm that “sellers of 
goods should not expect the new section 546(c) and the forty-five-day 
reach-back to improve their position.”128  These cases show that supplier’s 
reclamation rights are often worthless because the insolvent debtor’s 
inventory is subject to prior floating liens on after-acquired property.129 
The AMS case suggests that under the BAPCPA the reclamation 
became a “hollow remedy” when a debtor has a pre-petition secured claim 
that exceeds the value of the reclamation goods.130  The AMS showed that 
petition inventory held superior rights to a seller’s reclamation rights under the Uniform Commercial 
Code (“UCC”) or the bankruptcy code. The Court looks to State law to determine the property rights of 
the respective parties”). 
122. Incredible Auto Sales LLC, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024, at *3, *21, *31–32. 
123. Id. at *20–21. 
124. Id. See Thorne, supra note 119, at 2 (stating that “[w]here title had not passed, the security
interest had not attached and AAM was entitled to reclaim its vehicles”). 
125. See Thorne, supra note 119, at 2. 
126. Incredible Auto Sales LLC, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024, at *3, *31–32. 
127. Lee Harrington & Francis Morrisey, Retail Reclamation Claims: “Give Me Back My Stuff (or
at Least Pay Me For It)”, AM. BANKR. INST., NORTHEAST BANKR CONF., 300–01 (2009). 
128. See Thorne, supra note 119. 
129. Harrington & Morrisey, supra note 127, at 313. 
130. Bruce S. Nathan, Reclamation Rights Under BAPCPA: The Same Old Story, BUS.
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BAPCA’s new forty-five-day reclamation period is of limited utility 
because the insolvent buyer may not be in possession of the goods when 
the supplier seeks to enforce reclamation rights.131  In AMS, S&S sought to 
reclaim goods sold immediately after the commencement of bankruptcy, at 
the hearing three weeks later only a fraction, $800,000 out of $5 million, of 
the S&S goods remained in AMS’s possession.132 
The Dana case demonstrated that suppliers must be wary of effects 
DIP financing might have on pre-petition debt.  Even though suppliers’ 
reclamation rights are subject to prior rights of a security interest holder, 
suppliers’ opportunity for successful reclamation of goods may be further 
reduced by unfavorably drafted DIP agreement.  Dana suggests that to 
preserve reclamation rights, suppliers need to object in a timely fashion to 
provisions inconsistent with their reclamation rights in DIP orders that 
debtors and other post-petition lenders present to bankruptcy courts for 
approval.133 
The Incredible Auto Sales case affirmed that bankruptcy courts in 
different circuits are interpreting section 546(c) similarly.  Further, the 
court confirmed that suppliers cannot reclaim their goods when their 
reclamation rights are subordinate to those of secured lenders.  The court 
held that supplier may receive some compensation for its goods, if supplier 
does not deliver the certificate of title of the goods sold to the insolvent 
debtor.134 
Together these cases show that the enactment of BAPCPA’s section 
546(c) did not provide additional protection for the suppliers.  Rather, the 
practical consequence of section 546(c) demonstrate that the burden is on 
the suppliers to protect themselves against potential losses during business 
transactions with insolvent debtors or buyers nearing insolvency.  The 
burden is on the suppliers to do due diligence into buyer’s prior financing 
arrangements with its past and current creditors.  The suppliers are 
responsible for being certain that the goods sold are in the buyer’s 
possession when the reclamation rights are ultimately served.135 
CREDIT, Apr. 2007, at 22–25. 
131. Harrington & Morrisey, supra note 127, at 307. 
132. Id. at 308.
133. Harrington & Morrisey, supra note 127, at 313. 
134. Auto Auction Assocs. of Mont., Inc. v. Incredible Auto Sales LLC (In re Incredible Auto Sales
LLC), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024, at *3, 31–32 (Bankr. D Mont. Mar. 26, 2007) 
135. Harrington & Morrisey, supra note 127, at 313. 
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B. ADMINISTRATIVE PRIORITY STATUS UNDER SECTION 503(B)(9)
In addition to reclamation, suppliers also have the ability to seek a
priority administrative expense under BAPCPA section 503(b)(9).  Proper 
utilization of this section provides suppliers with an opportunity to improve 
the priority of their pre-petition claim.  This means that a supplier will be 
able to increase the likelihood of full and faster payment for goods sold to a 
financially distressed buyer that files for bankruptcy protection. 
1. Application and Beneficial Aspects of Section 503(b)(9)
The BAPCPA section 503(b)(9) provides an administrative priority
status for “the value of any goods received by the debtor within twenty 
days” of the petition date that “were sold to the debtor in the ordinary 
course of business of such debtor’s business.”136  The reason for allowing 
administrative priority status is to prevent debtors from acquiring goods on 
the brink of bankruptcy filing when the debtor knows it would be unable to 
pay for the purchased goods.137  The application of section 503(b)(9) is only 
limited to goods,138 where presumably the price is the value of the goods.139  
For the purposes of section 503(b)(9), the goods are defined by the 
U.C.C.140  The provision applies to all suppliers, irrespective of whether the
supplier delivers a reclamation demand.141
136. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) (West 2012) (noting that “[a]fter notice and a hearing, there shall be
allowed, administrative expenses, other than claims allowed under section 502(f) of this title [11 USCS 
§ 502(f)], including . . . (9) the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before the date
of commencement of a case under this title in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in the
ordinary course of such debtor’s business”).
137. COLLIER ON BANKR. P 503.16 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. Rev. 2011). 
138. Accordingly, any claims for services or personal property other than goods are not within §
503(b)(9). 
139. Judith Greenstone Miller & Jay L. Welford, 503(b)(9) Claimants – the New Constituent, A/K/A
“The 500 Pound Gorilla,” at the Table, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 487, 489 (2007) (stating that 
“[p]resumably, the invoice price of the goods (exclusive of interest, freight or other charges) would be 
applicable amount in valuing the claim, so long as it represents the price that was ordinarily used 
between the parties”). 
140. In re Samaritan Alliance, LLC, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1830, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jun. 20,
2008).  Under U.C.C. § 2-103(k), the term “goods” means all things that are movable at the time of 
identification to a contract for sale.  The term includes future goods, specially manufactured goods, the 
unborn young of animals, growing crops, and other identified things attached to realty as described in 
U.C.C. § 2-107. The term does not include information, the money in which the price is to be paid,
investment securities under Article 8, the subject matter of foreign exchange transactions, or chooses in
action.  See Rudolph J. Di Massa Jr. & Matthew E. Hoffman, UCC Definition of “Goods” Applies to
§503(b)(9), AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2009 (providing insight on the definition of goods).
141. Miller & Welford, supra note 139, at 489.  See Lisa Gretchko, The Bankruptcy Reform Act One
Year Later: A Disappointment for Trade Creditors, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 18, 18 (2007). 
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The section 503(b)(9) claim is particularly beneficial for suppliers 
because it ranks second on the bankruptcy priority list, and provides 
suppliers the same payment priority as debtor’s professionals.142  In most 
bankruptcy cases, administrative claims are paid in full.143  Further, a 
remedy under section 503(b)(9) is independent of reclamation claim under 
section 546(c), which means that reclamation defenses available to 
insolvent debtors under section 546(c) do not apply.144 
A supplier who exercises this right can be in a better position than 
unsecured creditors since the Chapter 11 reorganization plan cannot be 
confirmed unless all administrative expense claims are paid.  Unsecured 
creditors typically receive only a fraction of their claims. 
2. Negative Implications of Section 503(b)(9)
The application of section 503(b)(9) has its own drawbacks that
impact suppliers.  First, in order to obtain the administrative expense, the 
suppliers need to file a motion for allowance and payment of an 
administrative claim where they have the burden of proving that the claim 
is in fact administrative.145  Failure to timely file may preclude recovery 
and the filing dates vary by jurisdictions.146  This requires an engagement of 
counsel and payment of undesired legal fees.147  Since section 503(b)(9) 
claims are adverse to general unsecured claims due to priority, suppliers 
with section 503(b)(9) claims cannot rely on the committee of unsecured 
creditors to protect their interests.148  As a result, these suppliers must either 
defend their administrative claim alone or form their own ad hoc own 
committee.149  Again, this imposes undesired legal expenses on the 
suppliers. 
Second, even if the supplier is awarded a section 503(b)(9) 
administrative claim, it may not get paid.  The bankruptcy estate may 
become administratively insolvent, in which case the awarded section 
142. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (2010).
143. Stephen Selbst, BAPCPA Turns Three, COM. LENDING REV., Nov.-Dec. 2008, at 9–16 (noting
that “[i]n most cases, administrative claims are paid in full, rather than pennies on the dollar for general 
unsecured claims”). 
144. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9).  See Gretchko, supra note 141, at 19. 
145. In re Collins & Aikman Corp., 384 B.R. 751, 759 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008) (noting that “[a]
creditor seeking administrative expense priority has the burden of proving that its claim is within 
section 503”). 
146. Miller & Welford, supra note 139, at 490.  See In re Ward Prod., LLC, Case No. 06-50527
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006) (exemplifying various filing dates). 
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503(b)(9) claim will not be paid in full or at all.150 Supplier’s section 
503(b)(9) claim itself affects the bankruptcy estate because it provides for 
another claim that needs to paid, which may reduce the amount other 
claimants may receive.151  The DIP financing orders may provide lenders 
with first-priority liens on all assets, which include the administrative 
claims.152  As a result, suppliers with section 503(b)(9) claims will be paid 
after DIP lenders are paid. 
Third, the payment of section 503(b)(9) claims may be delayed by the 
debtor or by the creditor committee.  Under section 1129(a)(9) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, administrative claims are not required to be paid until 
the effective date of a Chapter 11 plan.153  Although the case law requires 
committee to act in the best interest of its constituency,154 committees are 
often composed of unsecured creditors with personal agendas and interests. 
Thus, stalling by other creditors opposing the plan may delay any payments 
to the supplier with a valid section 503(b)(9) expense. 
Fourth, supplier’s aggressive actions to obtain administrative claim 
payments by seeking adequate assurance from the debtor or by pushing for 
conversion of the case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 often do not provide 
any additional benefits.  Suppliers are unwilling to seek conversion because 
if the case is converted to Chapter 7 liquidation the obtained proceeds may 
not be sufficient to reach and pay any administrative claims.155  For 
instance, in In re Southern Prods., Inc. an ad hoc committee filed a request 
150. Gretchko, supra note 141, at 19. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 44 (noting that “[a]lthough trade creditors argue that this favorable treatment should be
limited to “new cash” from the lender, some courts overrule that objection. Aggressive administrative 
claimants might seek a carve-out from the secured creditor’s collateral or an assignment of other assets 
in order to ensure payment of the § 503(b)(9) claim. But the single trade creditor is often unwilling to 
finance that fight, or doesn’t have enough at stake to warrant the legal expense”). 
153. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9) (2010).  See In re Global Home Prods., LLC, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS
3608, at *9–10 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 21, 2006) (stating that “Section 503 does not specify a time for 
payment of these expenses but administrative expenses must be paid in full on the effective date of the 
plan as provided in §1129(a)(9)”). 
154. In re Haskell-Dawes, Inc., 188 B.R. 515, 519 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (stating that “the creditors
appointed to the creditors’ committee have a fiduciary obligation to act in the interests of the members 
whom they represent”); In re Nationwide Sports Distribs., Inc., 227 B.R. 455, 463 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1998) (stating that the purpose of committees is to “represent the interests of unsecured creditors and to 
strive to maximize the bankruptcy dividend paid to that class of creditors”). 
155. Gretchko, supra note 141, at 44–45 (stating that “[t]rade creditors might seek adequate
assurance that their administrative claims will be paid, and if the debtor is unable to provide that 
assurance, then they might be able to push for conversion of the case. However, some trade creditors 
are loath to seek conversion of the bankruptcy case because that would result in a liquidation of the 
debtor and the trade creditor would lose a customer, let alone the risk that the liquidation proceeds are 
not sufficient to reach administrative claims. Also, these protections are theoretical, at best, to the single 
trade creditor that doesn’t want to pay the legal fees inherent in obtaining them”). 
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for payment of section 503(b)(9) claims.156  The debtors opposed the 
motion for payment.  Eventually, the case was converted to Chapter 7 and 
issues pertaining to payment of section 503(b)(9) claims were deferred 
until the trustee could discover whether the funds existed for payment of 
the administrative claims.  When the trustee allowed claimants’ claims, 
there was no money in the estate to pay them.157  Accordingly, due to the 
incentives of better financial recovery, the suppliers are better off staying in 
Chapter 11. 
Fifth, section 503(b)(9) only permits the allowance of an 
administrative expense claim where the supplier can demonstrate “that the 
debtor has received the goods, and not just their value.”158  In In re Plastech 
Engineered Prods., a supplier sold goods to the debtor in the ordinary 
course of the debtor’s business in the twenty days prior to debtor filing for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.159  The supplier’s invoices stated that the goods 
were sold to the debtor, were billed to the debtor, but were shipped to a 
third party with whom the debtor had a separate agreement.160  The 
supplier’s invoices also indicated that payment for the goods was to be 
made by the debtor directly to the supplier. 
The supplier filed a motion requesting an order allowing section 
503(b)(9) expense for goods sold to a debtor during twenty days before the 
bankruptcy petition.161  The supplier argued that the value of the goods was 
received by the debtor and that the debtor had possession of the goods.162  
The debtor objected claiming that the goods were not received by the 
debtor as required by the statute, but were instead received by a third 
party.163  The court held for the debtor and stated that section 503(b)(9) 
156. In re Southern Prods., Inc., 2005 WL No. 05-61822 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.) (noting that in addition,
Motion for Return of Goods under § 546(c) was also filed). 
157. Gretchko, supra note 141 (stating that “[a]ccording to Deborah Kovsky-Apap of Pepper
Hamilton LLP (the firm representing the ad hoc committee), the chapter 7 trustee eventually allowed 
the claimants’ reclamation claims and their § 503(b)(9) claims, all as chapter 11 administrative claims 
—but as of Jan. 3, 2007, there has been no money in the estate to pay them!”). 
158. In re Plastech Engineered Prods., 394 B.R. 147, 151 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2008) (stating
that “§ 503(b)(9) only permits the allowance of an administrative expense claim where the 
administrative expense claimant demonstrates that the debtor has received the goods, and not just their 
value”). 
159. In re Plastech Engineered Prods., 394 B.R. at 151. 
160. In re Plastech Engineered Prods., 394 B.R. at 151. The debtor and third party had an agreement
entitled Extended Enterprise Agreement, which also reflected that supplier would ship the goods it sold 
to the debtor directly to third party. The supplier was not a party to the Extended Enterprise Agreement 
and its other terms are not set forth in the record. There was no contract between supplier and third 
party. Id. 
161. Id. at 149 (stating that the amount of § 503(b)(9)expense was $104,676.32).
162. Id. at 149–150. 
163. In re Plastech Engineered Prods., 394 B.R. 147, 150 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2008).
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requires the debtor to receive goods, not just the value of such goods.164  As 
a result of shipping the goods to the third party as requested by the debtor, 
the supplier could not receive the administrative expense priority status and 
diminished its chances of obtaining a full payment on its sale. 
Sixth, section 503(b)(9) only applies to goods.  In In re Goody’s 
Family Clothing, Inc., a debtor that operated approximately 350 family-
apparel retail stores, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.165  During the twenty 
days prior to debtor’s petition date, one of debtor’s service providers 
submitted a bill for inspecting, ticketing, and repackaging apparel that the 
debtor purchased from other vendors.166  The debtor objected asserting that 
the claim was misclassified because it was for the services provided and 
not for the goods sold.167  The court held for the debtor and stated that the 
term “goods” does not encompass services, thus denying creditor’s section 
503(b)(9) claim.168 
Seventh, a supplier may not compel an immediate payment of a 
section 503(b)(9) claim.169  In In re Global Home Prods., LLC., creditor-
supplier, Industria Mexicana de Aluminio, S.A. de C.V. (“IMASA”), filed 
a motion for allowance and immediate payment of a section 503(b)(9) 
claim.170  In their motion, IMASA argued that it is inequitable to delay the 
payment of administrative expense claim due to its priority.171  The debtor 
opposed the motion and claimed the financing order prohibited the 
payment of the claims or expenses.172  Debtor argued that they are only to 
pay administrative claims that are directly attributable to the operation of 
the business in the ordinary course of business and in accordance with the 
financing agreements, or by approval by the court and the DIP lender.173  
Debtor also argued that a payment of IMASA’s administrative claim could 
constitute default under the financing agreements and violate provisions of 
164. In re Plastech Engineered Prods., 394 B.R. at 152. 
165. In re Goody’s Family Clothing, Inc., 401 B.R. 131, 133 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009). 
166. Id. at 133 (noting that the bill amounted to $63,118.50). 
167. In re Goody’s Family Clothing, Inc., 401 B.R. at 133. 
168. Id. at 137.
169. Selbst, supra note 143, at 13. 
170. In re Global Home Prods., LLC, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3608, at *6 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 21,
2006) (noting that IMASA has requested allowance of its claims for the aluminum as an administrative 
expense claim in the amount of the full value of the goods and that Debtors make payment within three 
business days of the Court’s entry of an order granting the Motion). 
171. In re Global Home Prods., LLC, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3608, at *7 (noting that additionally,
IMASA claimed that it is entitled to adequate protection of its interest in cash collateral). 
172. Id. at *8 (noting that Paragraph 1.2 of the Final Financing Order prohibits Debtors’ use of loan
proceeds for payment of claims not provided for in the financing agreements and budget without the 
Court’s approval. Section 5.2 of the Ratification Agreement also restricts Debtors’ use of DIP 
Financing proceeds to pay administrative claims). 
173. Id. 
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the financing order.174  The Debtor claimed that immediate payment of 
§503(b)(9) claims would expose the Debtor to financial risk by adversely
affecting its borrowing ability.175  Finally, the Debtor contended that
§503(b)(9) does not require immediate payment and that it is silent on the
issue of timing.176
When a claimant timely files a request for payment of an 
administrative expense under section 503(a), the timing of the payment of 
that administrative claim is left to the discretion of the court.177  The court 
stated that three factors are considered in determining when to pay the 
administrative claim: (1) the prejudice to the debtors, (2) hardship to the 
claimant, and (3) potential detriment to other creditors.178 
In denying IMASA’s motion for immediate right to payment, the court 
found that IMASA would suffer little prejudice or hardship if 
administrative payment is deferred until confirmation of the plan.179  The 
court also found that due to Debtors financial position and requirements of 
the DIP financial agreement, Debtors will suffer substantial hardship if the 
immediate payment on IMASA’s section 503(b)(9) claim is presently 
allowed.180  
In another case, In re Bookbinders’ Rest., Inc., a different bankruptcy 
court decided that a creditor who holds an allowed administrative expense 
under section 503(b)(9) is not entitled to an immediate payment of the 
allowed expense.181  Bookbinder’s Restaurant (“Bookbinder’s”) filed a 
voluntary petition under Chapter 11 and continued its operations, while the 
committee of unsecured creditors was appointed.182  Bookbinder’s five 
creditors, each of which supplied goods to Bookbinder’s within twenty 
days of bankruptcy filing, requested the allowance of an administrative 
174. In re Global Home Prods., LLC, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3608, at *8. 
175. Id. at *8–9 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 21, 2006) 
176. Id. at *9.
177. Id. at *10–11.  In re Garden Ridge Corp., 323 B.R. 136, 143 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (noting the
discretion); Varsity Carpet Servs. v. Richardson (In re Colortex Indus.), 19 F.3d 1371, 1384 (11th Cir. 
1994).  See also In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 146 B.R. 520, 531 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992) (stating that 
“[i]n making this determination, one of the chief factors courts consider is bankruptcy’s goal of an 
orderly and equal distribution among creditors and the need to prevent a race to a debtor’s assets”). 
178. In re Global Home Prods., 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3608, at *12–13. 
179. Id. at *15–16. 
180. In re Global Home Prods., 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3608, at *15–16. 
181. In re Bookbinders’ Rest., Inc., 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3749, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 28,
2006). 
182. The “Old Original Bookbinders” is well known in the region as a “landmark” restaurant
located in Center City, Philadelphia. It is a not-for-profit corporation founded by the City of 
Philadelphia and the Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce to promote economic development in 
the City, the restaurant began operated continuously from 1865 to 2001. 
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expense under section 503(b)(9).183  The five creditors disagreed as to the 
timing of the payments of their administrative expenses under section 
503(b)(9).  One creditor agreed that expenses should be paid when all 
administrative expenses are paid and three other creditors agreed to defer 
the actual payment until the later date.184  The fifth creditor, Blue Crab Plus 
Sfd. (“Blue Crab”), insisted on immediate payment of its allowed 
expense.185 
Blue Crab argued that section 503(b)(9) requires debtor to treat 
administrative expenses in the same manner as administrative expenses 
arising from the post-petition delivery of goods and services,186 and that 
Debtor was financially able to make the payment.187  Bookbinder opposed 
the motion and argued that (1) payment of administrative expenses is 
within the discretion of the bankruptcy court; (2) monthly financial reports 
do not fully reflect operational reality, which is less liquid than it might 
appear; and (3) immediate payment to Blue Crab will impair its cash 
position and jeopardize its reorganization.188 
The court exercised its discretion and ruled against Blue Crab.  The 
court stated that section 503(b)(9) does not provide an explicit instruction 
for an immediate payment of administrative expenses to Blue Crab. To 
grant an automatic right to immediate payment of administrative expense to 
Blue Crab would expand the statutory provision and derogate the accepted 
principle that the timing of payment of an allowed administrative expense 
is within the court’s discretion.189  Further, the Court stated that Blue Crab 
failed to present authority supporting the contention that a section 503(b) 
administrative interest holder has an unqualified legal entitlement to be 
183. Bookbinders’ Rest., Inc., 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3749, at *3–4 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2006).
184. Id. at *5 (stating that “[o]ne of the five creditors, [U.S. Food Service, Inc.,] agreed that its
expense should be paid when the Debtor pays other administrative expenses in the case.  Three of the 
five creditors [Killian’s Harvest Green, Fichera Foods, Inc. and OceanPro Industries, Ltd.] agreed to 
defer the actual payment of the allowed administrative expense for the time being, while reserving the 
right to request immediate payment at a later time”). 
185. Bookbinders’ Rest., Inc., 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3749, at *5. 
186. Id. at *6 (noting that at the hearing, Blue Crab argued that if the Debtor was paying its utility
bills, it was equally obligated to pay its § 503(b)(9) administrative expenses). 
187. Id. (noting that Blue Crab stated that Debtor’s monthly operating report stated that Debtor had
over $200,000, which was sufficient to pay Blue Crab’s claim of $33,021.74). 
188. Bookbinders’ Rest., Inc., 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3749, at *7. 
189. Id. at *16 (noting that § 503(b)(9) does nothing more than “define a type of liability, previously
treated as pre-petition claim, which is now accorded administrative expense status.  The text of § 
503(b)(9) neither states or even implies the allowance of the expense encompasses an unqualified right 
to immediate payment.  Nor does the text of provision suggest that an administrative expense allowed 
under § 503(b)(9) is to be treated in a more favorable manner than any other allowed § 503(b) 
administrative expense.”  The Court noted that it is unaware of existence of any legislative history that 
would support Blue Crab’s argument.).  See H.R. Rep. No. 109-31 (2005) at 146. 
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paid at the same time as post-petition creditors that receive payments in the 
ordinary course of business.190 
Because of these two cases, immediate right to payment does not exist 
and the timing of administrative claims payments remains in the discretion 
of the bankruptcy court.191 
3. Implications of Phar-Mor, Inc.
The decision in Phar-Mor. Inc. addresses the supplier’s rights to
reclamation and administrative expense payments prior to passage of the 
BAPCPA.  Although the court’s decision was based on the pre-BAPCPA 
laws, it provides suppliers and creditors with relevant arguments for post-
BAPCPA litigation.192 
In, Phar-Mor, Inc., the debtor (“Phar-Mor”) filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy in September 2001, but continued to operate its business as 
DIP.  As a result, 141 of Phar-Mor’s suppliers sent reclamation claims 
seeking to recover goods they had delivered to Phar-Mor on credit totaling 
over $18 million.  Phar-Mor proposed that each supplier be granted an 
administrative expense priority claim under section 503(b) in the amount of 
its allowed reclamation claim.  All but one of Phar-Mor suppliers, 
McKesson, settled. 
Phar-Mor’s pre-petition debt amounted to $103 million, which 
consisted of loan and security agreements with some of its lenders. 
Substantially all of Phar-Mor’s assets, which included all reclamation 
goods and other inventory, secured this debt.  As part of reorganization, the 
bankruptcy court authorized Phar-Mor to borrow $135 million, which Phar-
Mor utilized to repay pre-petition secured creditors,193 thus extinguishing 
their secured interests.  The new creditors, the DIP lenders, received super-
priority status over remaining security interests, which included priority 
over any administrative expense claims, including one of McKesson.194 
After Phar-Mor paid its post-petition loan from the DIP lenders, expenses, 
190. Bookbinders’ Rest., Inc., 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3749, at *17.  Post-petition creditors get paid in
the ordinary course of business under 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1). 
191. Selbst, supra note 143, at 13. 
192. Lisa Gretchko, Sixth Circuit’s Phar-Mor Decision Breathes New Life into Reclamation
Remedy, 27 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 14, 54–55 (2008). 
193. The bankruptcy court authorized Phar-Mor to borrow the $135 million and gave the DIP
Lenders super-priority status in an Interim Order issued on the petition date. Phar-Mor  borrowed the 
money, repaid the pre-petition secured creditors (extinguishing their security interests), and gave the 
DIP Lenders super-priority security interests that same day. 
194. Phar-Mor, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 534 F.3d 502, 503–04 (6th Cir. Ohio 2008). 
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fees, and money allotted to reclamation claims, it was left with $30 million 
towards the payment of $185.5 million of general unsecured claims.195 
In February 2003, Phar-Mor motioned the bankruptcy court to 
reclassify its outstanding reclamation claims as general unsecured claims. 
In the support of its motion, Phar-Mor argued that supplier’s 
administrative-expense priority claims were extinguished when the goods 
subject to reclamation were sold with the proceeds used to pay the DIP 
lenders.  Conversely, the suppliers claimed that they were automatically 
entitled to either an administrative expense priority claim or a lien for a full 
amount of their reclamation rights allowed by section 546(c).196  The 
bankruptcy court denied Phar-Mor’s motion and held that even though the 
reclamation claims were rendered subject to DIP lender’s super-priority, 
the suppliers had properly filed their reclamation claims and had 
administrative-expense priority over the general claims.197 
After having its motion for reconsideration denied twice by the 
bankruptcy court, and having the district court uphold the bankruptcy court, 
Phar-Mor appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  On appeal, the 
main issue in Phar-Mor was whether the supplier’s administrative expense 
priority of its reclamation claim was barred when the goods subject to 
reclamation were sold and those proceeds were used to satisfy a secured 
creditor’s superior claim.198  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ 
decisions and held that McKesson was properly granted its administrative 
expense priority in lieu of its reclamation claim.199  In its ruling, the court 
noted that the state law granted supplier a right to reclaim its goods and that 
a secured creditor’s claim did not defeat that right.200  The court further 
found that pre-BAPCA section 546(c)(2) granted the bankruptcy court the 
power to deny a properly reclaiming supplier its right to reclaim goods, but 
only if the denied supplier is either given an administrative priority in the 
amount of the goods or a lien on the proceedings resulting from the use of 
those goods by the debtor.201 
The Phar-Mor decision is neither an anomaly nor a new trend, but 
rather a pro-supplier decision based on pre-BAPCPA laws.  As during the 
195. Phar-Mor, Inc., 301 B.R. at 504.
196. Id. at 496 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, 2003). See also Bruce S. Nathan, Are Reclamation Rights
Preserved Where Debtor’s Secured Dip Lender Pays Off Pre-Petition Secured Inventory Lender? Yes 
and No!, BUS. CREDIT, Mar. 2004, at 16–20.  
197. Phar-Mor, Inc., 301 B.R. at 504.
198. Id. at 503.
199. Phar-Mor, Inc., 301 B.R. at 504, 508. 
200. Id. at 508.
201. Id. See In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores Inc., 302 B.R. 128, 134 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(rendering creditor’s reclamation demands valueless and reclassified them as unsecured claims). 
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pre-BAPCPA period, the reclamation remains an ineffective remedy for 
suppliers, as illustrated by the post-BAPCPA decisions in AMS, Dana, and 
Incredible Auto Sales.202  In light of post-BAPCPA court holdings, debtors 
and secured creditors are likely to interpret the Phar-Mor decision as 
irrelevant to subsequent practice because Phar-Mor was confined to UCC’s 
narrower reclamation period and was based on the pre-BAPCPA version of 
section 546(c).203  Conversely, the suppliers may assert that the Phar-Mor 
holding is an attempt by the Sixth Circuit court to send a message that it is 
time to stop robbing suppliers of their remedies under UCC and the 
Bankruptcy Code.204  Further, although Phar-Mor never mentions section 
503(b)(9), suppliers are likely to argue that the holding is relevant to their 
claims because it stands for the proposition that section 503(b)(9) 
administrative remedy claims that were created post-BAPCA should not be 
eviscerated like reclamation remedies.205 
IV. REMEDIES UNDER STATE LAW
In addition to BAPCPA, suppliers that sold goods to an insolvent 
buyer or a buyer who becomes insolvent may seek remedies available 
under the applicable state law provisions of Uniform Commercial Code 
(“UCC”).206  For the purposes of UCC, “goods” are defined as all things, 
including specially manufactured goods, which are movable at the time of 
identification to the contract for sale.207  Under the UCC, the buyer is 
considered insolvent if: (1) the buyer generally ceased to pay debts in the 
ordinary course of business other than as a result of a bona fide dispute 
pertaining to those debts; (2) the buyer is unable to pay debts as they 
become due; or (3) if the buyer is insolvent within the meaning of the 
federal bankruptcy law.208 
202. Gretchko, supra note 192, at 55. Although cases such as In re Lawrence Paperboard Corp., 52
B.R. 907 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985), In re Shattuc Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992), In re 
Pester Refining Co., 964 F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1992), and In re Arlco, 239 B.R. 261 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1999) did not kill reclamation altogether, they rendered it a useless remedy.  By the late 1990s, case law 
had evolved to eviscerate completely the reclamation remedy. 
203. Gretchko, supra note 192, at 54–55. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Harrington & Morrisey, supra note 127, at 301. (“Outside of bankruptcy, § 2-702 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) governs reclamation.”). 
207. U.C.C. § 2-105 (2004). Money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities and things
in action by definition are not goods.  The term “goods” also includes the unborn young of animals and 
growing crops and other identified things attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be 
severed from realty (§ 2-107). Id. 
208. U.C.C. § 1-201(23) (2004). See Nathan, supra note 130, at 22. Insolvency is based on either
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A. RESCISSION OF SALE
The UCC provides the supplier of goods on credit with remedies to
rescind the sale and reclaim the goods delivered to the insolvent buyer.209  
This remedy is available when the buyer fails to perform in the accordance 
with the contact,210 such as tender a payment for the purchased goods when 
due.211 
B. GOODS IN TRANSIT
If the supplier discovers that the buyer is insolvent, the supplier may
refuse to deliver or stop the delivery to the buyer in accordance to its 
contractual obligations.212  The supplier may stop the delivery even if the 
contract calls for an extension of credit terms, such as a payment due 
within thirty days of the receipt of the invoice, unless the supplier is 
immediately paid in cash.213 
Upon learning of buyer’s insolvency, the supplier may also stop 
delivery of goods in transit or in the possession of a carrier or a bailee.214  
The supplier has the right to stop delivery until the insolvent buyer receives 
the goods.215  The supplier may stop delivery of goods whether they are in 
the balance sheet test where liabilities exceed assets, or the equity test where the debtor has ceased 
paying its debts in the ordinary course of business or is unable to pay its debts as they become due.  See 
11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (2004) for federal bankruptcy code definition of insolvency. 
209. U.C.C. § 2-702(1) (2004). Seller’s Remedies on Discovery of Buyer’s Insolvency: (1) Where
the seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent he may refuse delivery except for cash including payment 
for all goods theretofore delivered under the contract, and stop delivery under this Article (§ 2-705).  (2) 
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent he may reclaim 
the goods upon demand made within ten days after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has 
been made to the particular seller in writing within three months before delivery the ten day limitation 
does not apply. Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on 
the buyer’s fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay.  (3) The seller’s 
right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good 
faith purchaser under this Article (§ 2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other 
remedies with respect to them. U.C.C. § 2-705 (2004). 
210. U.C.C. § 2-703(1) (2004). 
211. Id., § 2-703(2)(f).
212. U.C.C. § 2-703(1), § 2-703(2)(a), § 2-703(2)(b).
213. Atwood-Kellogg, Inc. v. Nickerson Farms, 602 N.W. 2d 749, 752 (1999) (stating that the
burden is on the seller to show that the seller demand the cash payment from the buyer). 
214. U.C.C. § 2-705(1) (2003). The seller may stop delivery of goods in the possession of a carrier
or other bailee when he discovers the buyer to be insolvent (§ 2-702) and may stop delivery of carload, 
truckload, planeload or larger shipments of express or freight when the buyer repudiates or fails to make 
a payment due before delivery or if for any other reason the seller has a right to withhold or reclaim the 
goods. Id. 
215. U.C.C. § 2-705(2)(a) (2003).
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possession of the carrier or a bailee.216  To prevent the delivery of the 
goods, the supplier must notify the carrier or bailee.217  This notice must be 
received by the carrier or bailee in sufficient time to halter the delivery.218  
After such notification, the carrier or bailee must hold and deliver the 
goods according to the supplier’s directions.219  As a result, the supplier is 
liable to the bailee for any ensuing charges or damages.220 
Once the buyer receives or has constructive possession of the goods, 
the supplier’s right to stop the delivery is extinguished.221  Thereafter, the 
supplier may only get the goods back through reclamation process under 
the state law.222 
C. CASH ON DELIVERY
The supplier may refuse delivery unless cash payment is made for all
the goods to be delivered under the contract.223  When the supplier 
discovers that the buyer is insolvent, the supplier may unilaterally change 
the contract terms and require buyer to pay immediately for prior deliveries 
in cash.224  In addition to withholding the delivery of goods, the seller may 
require additional assurances of payment only in cash for deliveries.  This 
rule applies even if prior deliveries were made and even if the contract’s 
credit terms had not expired as to the due date of payments relating to prior 
deliveries.225 
The term “cash” has a specific application under the U.C.C.  The term 
suggests that the supplier is not required to accept a check or any other 
financial instrument except for physical cash from the buyer.  Although a 
solvent buyer’s check is commercially normal and proper, it is 
unreasonable to make supplier accept insolvent buyer’s check because of 
216. U.C.C. §2-705(2)(b). (2003).
217. U.C.C. § 2-705(3)(a) (2003).
218. Id. 
219. U.C.C. § 2-705(3)(b) (2003). There is an exception to this rule. If a negotiable document of
title has been issued for goods, the bailee is not obliged to obey a notification to stop until surrender of 
the document. See U.C.C. § 2-705(3)(c) (2003).  In addition, a carrier who has issued a nonnegotiable 
bill of lading is not obliged to obey a notification to stop received from a person other than the 
consignor. See U.C.C. § 2-705(3)(d) (2003). 
220. Id. 
221. U.C.C. § 2-705(2)(a)–(d) (2003). See Donegal Steel Foundry Co. v. Accurate Products Co.,
516 F.2d 583, 584 n. 21 (3d Cir. N.J. 1975) (noting that “[u]nder a bailment contract a bailee may be 
directed to return the identical thing bailed or its product to the bailor”). 
222. In re Kellstrom Indus., 282 B.R. 787, 790 n. 3 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (noting the state law
differences). 
223. U.C.C. § 2-702(1) (2003). 
224. In re Layton Fabrics, Ltd., 1969 WL 11021, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 14, 1969). 
225. Id. 
 (  
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the great likelihood that check will be dishonored when presented for 
payment.226 
D. RECLAMATION UNDER STATE LAW
In general, under the U.C.C. state law provides for the reclamation of
goods delivered to the insolvent buyer if the supplier can satisfy all of the 
following conditions: (1) goods were sold to the debtor on credit terms, (2) 
debtor was insolvent at the time it received the goods, and (3) the supplier 
demanded return of the goods within ten days of the debtor’s receipt of the 
goods.227  If the buyer makes misrepresentations to the supplier pertaining 
to its solvency, the time for reclamation is extended.228  To successfully 
reclaim the goods sold, some states require that the goods sold must still be 
in the possession of the insolvent buyer and identifiable when the demand 
is received.229 
The supplier’s reclamation rights are subject to the rights of a good 
faith purchaser.230  The U.C.C. defines “purchaser” as a person that takes 
by a purchase231, and “purchase” as taking by sale, lease, discount, 
negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, security interest, issue or reissue, gift, 
or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property.”232  A 
purchaser of supplier’s goods from the insolvent transferor, the initial 
226. 3 RICHARD W. DUESENBERG, LAWRENCE P. KING, HENRY DEEB GABRIEL, & WILLIAM H.
HENNING, SALES & BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE U.C.C. § 13.03 2 (Matthew Bender ed., 2011). 
227. U.C.C. §2-702 (2003). Under U.C.C. section 2-705(2) a “seller may reclaim the goods upon
demand made within a reasonable time after the buyer’s receipt of the goods” where reasonable time is 
defined by “nature, purpose, and circumstances of the action” under U.C.C. § 1-205(a). However, states 
that adopted the UCC provide for a more definite term defining time. For example, see Chapter 106, 
section 2-702(1) of the Massachusetts General Laws, “where the seller discovers the buyer to be 
insolvent he may refuse delivery except for cash including payment for all goods theretofore delivered 
under the contract, and stop delivery under this Article (section 2-705)” and section 2-702(2) “[w]here 
the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the 
goods upon demand made within ten days after the receipt . . . . ”  See also Nathan, supra note 130, at 
23. 
228. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (2003).  Under a state law, a supplier may have unlimited time to reclaim its
goods if the buyer made a written misrepresentation of solvency within three months of supplier’s 
delivery of goods.  For example, chapter 106, section 2-207(2) of the Massachusetts General Laws 
states: “if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in writing within three 
months before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply.” 
229. Flav-O-Rich, Inc. v. Rawson Food Serv., Inc., 846 F.2d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir. 1988); Galey &
Lord, Inc. v. Arley Corp. (In re Arlco., Inc.), 239 B.R. 261, 266–67.  See Harrington & Morrisey, supra 
note 127, at 301–02; Monfort, Inc. v. Kunkel (In re Morken), 182 B. R. 1007, 1017 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
1995) (slaughtered cows, not identifiable at the time reclamation demand, are not subject to 
reclamation). 
230. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (2003). 
231. U.C.C. § 1-201(30) (2003).
232. U.C.C. § 1-201(29) (2003).
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buyer, acquires all title that the insolvent transferor had or had power to 
transfer.233  An insolvent buyer-transferor with voidable title has power to 
transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.234 
This means that a secured creditor with a floating inventory lien has a 
priority over the rights of the reclaiming supplier.235  The courts have held 
that secured creditors with liens on insolvent buyer’s inventory are good 
faith purchasers and thus have superior rights to a reclaiming supplier.236 
V. CONDITIONS THAT IMPROVE THE LEVERAGE OF A SUPPLIER
Leverage in the context of a supplier’s negotiations for payment of
accounts receivable due the supplier refers to the bargaining power that the 
supplier has in negotiating favorable terms from a bankrupt or financially 
troubled customer.  While legislation and case law clearly disadvantage a 
supplier who is owed money by a bankrupt customer, a supplier can 
improve its negotiating position if it displays foresight in its contract 
negotiation.  Three important issues impact a supplier’s leverage: (1) the 
true contract partner, (2) the nature of the contract’s duration, and (3) the 
time remaining on the contract. 
The courts make an important distinction between a contract involving 
a supplier and a bankrupt corporation and a contract between a supplier and 
one of a bankrupt corporation’s subsidiaries.237  The bankruptcy of a 
corporation may not be automatically synonymous with the bankruptcy of 
its subsidiaries and affiliates.  Thus, a supplier who contracts with an 
insolvent subsidiary of a bankrupt parent corporation can move 
233. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (2003). A purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of
the interest purchased.  Id. 
234. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (2003). Under UCC, the term “good faith,” except as otherwise provided in
Article 5, means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.  
See U.C.C. § 1-201(20).  As per U.C.C. § 2-403(1), when goods have been delivered to the good faith 
buyer under a transaction of purchase, the good faith buyer has such power even though (a) the 
transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, (b) the delivery was in exchange for a check 
which is later dishonored, (c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a “cash sale,” or (d) the 
delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law. Id. 
235. Nathan, supra note 130, at 22.  See Harrington & Morrisey, supra note 127, at 302.
236. Allegiance Healthcare Corp. v. Primary Health Svs. (In re Primary Health Sys.), 258 B.R. 111,
117 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (“[a] creditor with a prior perfected security interest in inventory which 
contains an after-acquired property clause is a good faith purchaser under the UCC”). 
237. See Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Coneco Corp., 339 F. Supp. 2d 425  (2004) (where in
denying the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment and refusing to employ piercing of the corporate 
veil doctrine, the court has held that the parent company was not liable for the breach of contract of its 
insolvent subsidiary).  See also, Brad B. Erens, Scott J. Friedman, & Kelly M. Mayerfeld, Bankrupt 
Subsidiaries: The Challenges to the Parent of Legal Separation, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 66 (2008) 
available at http://www.law.emory.edu/fileadmin/journals/bdj/25/25.1/ErensFriedman_Mayerfeld.pdf. 
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expeditiously to improve the likelihood of full payment of its accounts 
receivable. 
The courts distinguish between the parties’ obligations under long 
verses short-term contracts.238  If the contract is short-term or order-by-
order, the supplier is often not required by the court to comply with the 
terms of the contract on an extended basis.239  However, if the contract is 
long-term, the supplier is likely to be obligated to comply with the existing 
contract’s terms even when payment is delayed indefinitely or bankruptcy 
of the customer is approved.240 
In essence, the shorter the time remaining on a contract, the greater the 
leverage a supplier has over a financially troubled or bankrupt customer.  It 
is unlikely that the debtor would be able to negotiate better terms with a 
new supplier than it can with the current supplier, who probably has vested 
interests in the debtor’s financial recovery, not the least of which is the full 
payment of accounts receivable.  Consequently, a supplier with little time 
remaining on a contact with an insolvent or nearly insolvent debtor may be 
able to renegotiate especially favorable terms for a new or extended 
contract.  Such terms might include requirements for accelerated or 
immediate payment of outstanding receivables, cash in advance or cash on 
delivery in lieu of credit terms, and an order-by-order rather than long-term 
arrangement. 
VI. EARLY ACTION SUPPLIER TACTICS
Upon the discovery of the customer’s insolvency, the supplier can 
utilize the U.C.C. to force a renegotiation with the debtor prior to the 
debtor’s bankruptcy hearing.  In addition to the options described in prior 
sections,241 a supplier with an ongoing contract or outstanding accounts 
receivable from a bankrupt customer can consider other tactics to improve 
its outcome, specifically quick positioning for contract assumption, 
238. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (noting that subject to a court’s approval, a trustee may assume or reject
any executor contract of the debtor). 
239. Id. 
240. Id.  See also 11 U.S.C. § 363. This section of the bankruptcy code permits the debtor in
possession or a trustee to sell property obtained from the suppliers in the regular course of business.  
See also In re HLC Properties, Inc., 55 B.R. 685 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) (discussing application of 11 
U.S.C. 363). 
241. This is relevant to U.C.C. § 2-702, which provides that a seller may refuse delivery except for
cash when it discovers the buyer to be insolvent, and to U.C.C. § 2-703, which provides that where a 
buyer refuses to make payment due on or before delivery then, with respect to any goods directly 
affected, the aggrieved seller (supplier) may withhold or stop delivery of goods, even if they are in 
transit under U.C.C. § 2-705.  
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obtaining critical supplier status, and securing adequate assurance of the 
debtor’s future performance. 
A. QUICK CONTRACT ASSUMPTION
A financially distressed debtor must assume or reject an executory
contract for the sale of goods before confirmation of its plan of 
reorganization.242  A supplier that is a party to an executory contract is 
obligated to perform during the period between the bankruptcy filing and 
assumption or rejection of the contract.243  If the supplier decides to 
suspend or not honor the agreement, the debtor may assert legal claims 
against the supplier for breach of contract and violations of the automatic 
stay.244 
For a supplier, contract assumption can be advantageous because the 
debtor must resolve outstanding receivables and all other monetary defaults 
that arose prior to the bankruptcy.245  In addition, the debtor must give 
adequate assurance of its future performance under the contract.  Another 
benefit is that claims under assumed contracts are assigned administrative 
priority, requiring that they be paid in full on confirmation of the 
bankruptcy plan. Additionally, the bankruptcy code allows compelling the 
debtor to make an early assumption or rejection decision.246  Finally, 
242. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2003).  A contract is executory if obligations are owed by both parties to the
contract.  See In re Dynamic Tooling Sys., Inc., 349 B.R. 847, 852-53 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006).  Under 
section 541, executory contracts are part of the estate’s property. Section 1123(b)(2) states that a 
bankruptcy plan may, subject to the provisions of section 365, provide for the assumption or rejection 
of executory contracts. Further, section 1123(b)(3) states that a plan may not only provide for the 
adjustment and settlement of any claims or interests of the debtor or the estate, but also that the trustee, 
the debtor, or a special representative of the estate may retain and enforce such claims or interests. 
243. Bruce S. Nathan, A Trade Creditor’s Post-Petition Obligations Under An Unexpired Executory
Contract Prior To Assumption Or Rejection: The Muddled State Of The Law, BUS. CREDIT, Sep. 2006, 
at 1 (noting that “[i]f a debtor wishes to assume an executory contract or lease, the debtor must, among 
other things, cure all payment and other defaults under the contract, or provide adequate assurance of 
such cure, and provide adequate assurance of the debtor’s ability to perform all of its future obligations 
under the contract. If the debtor rejects the contract, the debtor is deemed to have breached the contract 
as of the bankruptcy filing date and the creditor has an unsecured claim for its damages arising from 
such breach. Rejection also relieves the creditor of any further obligations under the contract”). 
244. Id. at 2 (noting that meanwhile the debtor may compel “the creditor to continue selling goods
or providing services prior to any decision to assume or reject the contract, while the debtor is free to 
seek rejection of contract (and thereby terminate any further obligation to perform) any time during the 
bankruptcy case”). 
245. In re United Am., Inc., 327 B.R. 776, 786 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005) (noting that “[i]n order to
assume an executory contract, the debtor must cure or provide adequate assurance that it will promptly 
cure its default. Its default is the failure to pay the pre-petition claim in accordance with the contract. 
The debtor must also give assurances of future performance”). 
246. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2).  Under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee may
assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of residential real property or of personal 
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assumption of the contract gives the supplier an incumbent’s advantages in 
extending the contract on favorable terms.  For these reasons, a supplier 
may find it advantageous to position for early contract assumption. 
B. CRITICAL SUPPLIER STATUS
The principle of bankruptcy law that similarly situated creditors
receive equal treatment is not universally held.247  A supplier in search of a 
viable post-petition strategy for collecting payment of pre-petition 
receivables should consider the benefits of being designated as a “critical 
supplier.”  The critical supplier doctrine is an exception created by the 
courts in some states, including Delaware, Michigan, and New York, that 
allows an insolvent customer to argue for special status from a particular 
supplier.248  A motion to pay critical vendors is a request for the court to 
authorize an exception to the general principle favoring equal treatment of 
property of the debtor at any time before the confirmation of a plan but the court, on the request of any 
party to such contract or lease, may order the trustee to determine within a specified period of time 
whether to assume or reject such contract or lease.  Id. 
247. See Sumy v. Schlossberg, 777 F.2d 921, 932 (4th Cir. Md. 1985) (noting that “[the]
longstanding principle of equal treatment of similarly situated creditors may be violated”).  See also In 
re Piper Aircraft Corp. 168 B.R. 434, 440 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (suggesting that the benefits of fresh start in 
bankruptcy law may supersede the principal of creditor’s equal treatment). 
248. The judicially created exception of “critical supplier” has its roots in the doctrine of necessity.
For example: 
 The policy of equal treatment of creditors does not trump freedom of contract.  Absent 
a contractual agreement, there is no obligation to deal with another party, whether a 
party in bankruptcy or not.  Without a contract, suppliers can refrain from dealing with a 
debtor.  Frequently, the decision to do so is based more on the uncertainty of payment 
for post-petition goods and services.  A problem arises when the theory of equal 
treatment meets the reality that, from time to time, certain suppliers are essential to the 
continued viability of a business and a debtor’s ability to reorganize. If the suppliers 
legitimately decline to have further dealings with the debtor, the reorganization effort 
will come to an end before it has had an opportunity to begin.  In this instance, it is 
impossible to reconcile the objectives of encouraging reorganizations and assuring the 
equal treatment of creditors.  To insist upon the latter necessarily precludes the former. 
The Doctrine of Necessity is an attempt to reconcile these principles in these narrow 
circumstances.  The remedy, payment of select pre-petition unsecured claims, flies in 
the face of all of the notions of equal treatment of creditors. It is, however, a necessary 
deviation because otherwise there will be no reorganization and no creditor will have an 
opportunity to recoup any part of its pre-petition claim . . .  Three tests for the 
application of the Doctrine of Necessity have developed which, if applied, retain the 
narrowness and the exceptional quality of the Doctrine: (1) the vendor must be 
necessary for the successful reorganization of the debtor; (2) the transaction must be in 
the sound business judgment of the debtor; and (3) the favorable treatment of the critical 
vendor must not prejudice other unsecured creditors. 
See United Am., Inc., 327 B.R. at 781–82. 
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similar claims, and pay one prepetition creditor ahead of others.249  
Consequently, such a request is carefully scrutinized and is only granted 
when the circumstances establish that the selected payments are necessary 
to the reorganization case and will ultimately benefit all creditors of the 
estate.250  According to the Doctrine of Necessity,251 a supplier is critical if: 
(1) it is the only supplier of “essential goods and services,”252
(2) it supplies “essential goods and services at a significantly reduced
price,”253 and
(3) it would not “survive non-payment of pre-petition claims,” and
would therefore stop supplying the debtor.254
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas held that
section 105(a) of the U.C.C. authorizes bankruptcy courts to authorize 
payment of prepetition claim to creditors that are critical to the debtor’s 
continued operation.255  The court created the following three-element test 
of the debtor for determining when payment of prepetition claim to 
suppliers is critical and allowed:256 (1) evidence that dealing with the 
claimant is indispensable to profitable operations or preservation of the 
estate,257 (2) evidence that failing to deal with the claimant will likely cause 
harm or eliminate an economic advantage that is greater than the amount 
claimed,258 and (3) evidence that no practical or legal alternative exists by 
which the debtor can deal with the claimant and that payment is the only 
249. In re Coserv, LLC, 273 B.R. 487, 494 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).  See Osborne v. Howell
Electric Motors (In re Fultonville Metal Prods. Co.), 330 B.R. 305, 313 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) 
(stating that “[t]he request to pay selected prepetition vendors is a clear departure from basic bankruptcy 
precepts”). 
250. Fultonville Metal Prods. Co., 330 B.R. at 313. See In re Tropical Sportswear Int’l Corp., 320
B.R. 15, 17 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (where the court found that the payment of critical vendors should 
be approved only upon an evidentiary showing that “(1) the payments were necessary to the debtor’s 
reorganization; (2) that a sound business reason justified the payments, in that the vendors would refuse 
to do business with the debtor absent the payments; and (3) that the disfavored creditors would not be 
harmed by the payments”). 
251. Andrew J. Currie & Sean McCann, Hold on to Those Payments, Critical Vendors: Capital




255. In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487, 493, 497 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002). 
256. Id. at 498–99. 
257. Id. at 498.  (noting that “[t]o meet this requirement debtor must show that, for one reason or
another, dealing with the claimant is virtually indispensable to profitable operations or preservation of 
the estate”). 
258. Id. at 498–99 (“[A] . . . debtor must show that meaningful economic gain to the estate or to the
going-concern value of the business will result or that serious economic harm will be avoided through 
payment of the prepetition claim, which itself is materially less than the potential loss to the estate or 
business”). 
  
Summer 2012 SUPPLIER TACTICS 441 
alternative.259 
If critical supplier status is granted, (a) the supplier is paid in advance 
of and at a higher percentage than other general unsecured creditors and (b) 
its pre-bankruptcy claims converted into administrative claims that must be 
paid in full prior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization.260  However, 
there is a major downside for a critical supplier, namely that the supplier is 
often required by negotiations with the debtor to waive their 
section 2-503 (b)(9) claims and associated rights. 
C. ADEQUATE ASSURANCE OF FUTURE PERFORMANCE
Under U.C.C. section 2-609, if reasonable insecurity exists concerning
a debtor’s ability or willingness to satisfy its future financial obligations, 
such as late payments, the supplier can issue a demand for adequate 
assurance of performance.261  The debtor must then provide written 
assurances to the supplier of the debtor’s ability to satisfy future 
obligations, including evidence of financial viability such as a letter of 
credit.262  If a debtor fails to provide the demanded adequate assurance, the 
supplier has the right to modify or suspend its performance under the 
contract.263 
Such situations arose frequently in 2008-2009 when secondary 
suppliers (tier-2) that provide products to direct suppliers (tier-1) of a 
bankrupt corporation employed a tactic involving provisions of Article 2 of 
the U.C.C. in an effort to receive payment for delivered goods or services. 
259. CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. at 499 (stating that “[i]f payment is intended to assuage the
[creditor’s] concern about future dealings, a deposit, collect on delivery terms, payment of shipment and 
countless other devices are available that will not offend the general principle that prepetition claims 
should not be paid”). 
260. 11 U.S.C. § 105.
261. U.C.C. section 2-609 provides: (1) A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that
the other’s expectation of receiving due performance will not be impaired.  When reasonable grounds 
for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party, the other may in writing demand 
adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives such assurance may, if commercially 
reasonable, suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed return.  (2) 
Between merchants, the reasonableness of grounds for insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance 
offered shall be determined according to commercial standards.  (3) Acceptance of any improper 
delivery or payment does not prejudice the aggrieved party’s right to demand adequate assurance of 
future performance.  (4) After receipt of a justified demand failure to provide within a reasonable time, 
not exceeding 30 days, such assurance of due performance as is adequate under the circumstances of the 
particular case is a repudiation of the contract.  Id. 
262. Several court rulings clarify the requirements for written notice. See Nati’l Ropes, Inc. v. Nat’l
Diving Serv., Inc., 513 F. 2d 53 (5th Cir. 1975); contra, ARB, Inc. V. E-Systems, Inc., 663 F.2d 189 
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Automated Energy Systems, Inc. v. Fibers and Fabrics of Georgia, Inc., 298 S.E. 2d 
328 (1982); Scott v. Crown, 765 P.2d 1043 (Colo. App. 1988). 
263. U.C.C. § 2-609, official cmt. 2 (2004).
  
442 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 8:2 
For example, tier-1 suppliers in the automobile industry filed motions 
under U.C.C. section 2-609 asserting that they had reasonable grounds for 
insecurity concerning the debtor’s ability to perform under the terms of the 
supply contracts.264  The suppliers consequently claimed that they were 
entitled to adequate assurance of future performance of the debtor as a 
precondition to satisfying their own contractual obligations.265 
Reasonable grounds for insecurity are determined in fact by 
commercial standards, and require that the supplier provide an objective 
factual basis for its insecurity, such as the debtor’s failure to satisfy past 
due accounts. In instances where the supplier has reason to believe that the 
customer is in financial distress but not yet declared bankrupt, the supplier 
can unilaterally impose terms of cash-in-advance or cash-on-delivery as 
explicitly authorized under U.C.C. §2-702(1). 
Timing is critical in attempting to benefit from an adequate assurance 
claim.  Once a debtor is granted a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the debtor 
typically demands that a supplier continue to perform on an underlying 
contract.  The debtor will file a motion to enforce the automatic stay and 
the terms and conditions of the existing contract even though it offers no 
post-petition payment to suppliers or modifications to the contract that are 
objectionable to the supplier.266 
VII. THE CURRENT REALITY AND UNSETTLED ISSUES
The recession of 2007-2009 and the lingering post-recessionary 
effects have tested the corporate bankruptcy process.  In particular, there 
was scrutiny of the safeguards designed to prevent suppliers from bearing 
an unfair financial burden from their contractual agreements with 
financially distressed corporate customers.  The BAPCPA of 2005 was 
intended to enhance traditional protections and remedies for suppliers. 
However, after several years of litigation, the conclusion may be drawn that 
264. See Daniel N. Sharkey, The “Car Wars” in Court: Steel, Plastics, Terms, and Other Fronts in
Automotive Supply Litigation, Mich. B. J., Dec. 2008, http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/ pdf4article 
1450.pdf (discussing litigation of automotive suppliers). 
265. Patrick Mears, Long Term Supply Contracts In Auto Supplier Bankruptcies, AUTOMOBILE
BANKR. RESOURCES, Oct. 20, 2009, http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/bankruptcylaw/blogs/ 
bankruptcycommentary/archive/2009/09/15/long-term-supply-contracts-in-auto-supplier-bankruptcies.a 
spx. 
266. In many bankruptcy cases, the debtor will reject the demands of suppliers for cash on delivery
or cash in advance.  In In re Visteon Corp., 2010 WL 1416796 (Bankr. D. Del.), Visteon sent a letter 
notifying its suppliers that an automatic stay had been imposed to prevent third parties from taking 
actions against its assets without prior approval of the Bankruptcy Court, under § 362 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.  Therefore, Visteon reasoned that the supplier’s demands, which in the debtor’s view represented 
noncourt approved, unilaterally demands, would violate the automatic stay.  
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the provisions have failed to deliver on their promise.  The general 
provisions of section 503(b)(9) and section 546(c) are now swallowed by 
exceptions, which complicates suppliers’ understanding of their rights 
when a debtor files for bankruptcy and provide significant obstacles to 
recovery of either payment or goods sold. 
Even with the enactment of section 546(c), which substantially 
extended the time for reclamation claims, suppliers continue to encounter 
the same pre-BAPCPA obstacles to relief267 as evidenced by court holdings 
in the AMS, Dana, and Incredible Auto Sales.  By the time the reclamation 
demand is made, most of the debtor’s asset-based financing has a 
prioritized lien on the goods the supplier is attempting to reclaim.  Thus, if 
the value of a reclaiming a supplier’s goods does not exceed the amount of 
debt secured by the prior lien, the supplier’s reclamation claim is 
valueless.268  Further, by the time of reclamation demand, the goods sold by 
the supplier may become commingled with debtors finished product or 
resold, which again makes reclamation moot.  As a result, the suppliers’ 
efforts to reclaim goods under section 546(c) rarely produce any beneficial 
results.269 
Although section 503(b)(9) attempts to improve the supplier’s position 
pertaining to goods sold to the debtor within the twenty days pre-
bankruptcy, the actual benefit to be derived by the supplier is at best 
illusory.270  In reality, if the supplier is unable to obtain an immediate 
payment of a section 503(b)(9) claim and the case is thereafter rendered 
administratively insolvent, the supplier is unlikely to ever receive money 
on its claim.271  A section 503(b)(9) claim does not give an immediate right 
to payment and the scheduling remains in the discretion of the bankruptcy 
court.  If the value of the bankruptcy estate is less than the value of the filed 
administrative claims, the supplier and other creditors must agree how their 
respective individual claims will be paid.  Notwithstanding providing new 
remedies for suppliers that deliver goods to the debtor within a twenty-day 
prepetition period, the BAPCPA fails to provide adequate remedies for 
businesses that provide services. 
Despite the new BAPCPA provisions, the questions of how a supplier 
may reclaim the goods sold or receive full payment on its goods sold to a 
267. Nathan, supra note 130, at 22–25. 
268. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 409, 419 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
269. Jack F. Williams, Circuit City Unplugged: Why Did Chapter 11 Fail to Save 34,000 Jobs? 
JUDICIARYHOUSE.GOV (Mar. 11, 2009),  http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Williams090311.pdf. 
270. Miller & Welford, supra note 139, at 494. 
271. Id. 
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customer who thereafter filed for bankruptcy remain unanswered. 
Additional uncertainty in the law still exists272 as supplier advocates believe 
that the Phar-Mor decision reopened the possibility of viable reclamation 
claims273 and the language of section503(b)(9) administrative claims 
continues to be interpreted differently by the courts.274  It is unlikely that 
the drafters of BAPCPA envisioned the various ancillary issues that would 
arise from their new legislation and its ineffectiveness to address 
previously existing issues pertaining to suppliers.  Thus, unless the 
BAPCPA’s provisions are amended or uncertainty is greatly reduced in 
supplier bankruptcy practices, the goal of providing greater protection for 
suppliers will remain unaccomplished. 
272. Muazzin Mehrban, Proposals to Repeal Certain Provisions of BAPCPA, 
FINANCIERWORLDWIDE.COM. (Feb. 2010), http://www.financierworldwide.com/article.php?id=5921& 
page=2 (stating that “BAPCPA is the most complicated overhaul of the bankruptcy code for several 
decades, and despite it being four years since its implementation, certain areas of the law remain hazy”). 
273. Wanda Borges, Hot Issues in Bankruptcy in Today’s Economic Climate, NAT’L. ASS’N. OF
CREDIT MGMT., 2009 (noting that “[i]nterestingly, despite the ruling in the Dana case, a subsequent 
ruling may have reopened the possibility of viable reclamation claims. Long dormant, the 6th Circuit 
Court of Appeals rendered its decision in the Phar-Mor, Inc. v. McKesson Corp. case in 2008. The 
Sixth Circuit found that properly reclaimed goods remain the seller’s property and never become the 
debtor’s property, thus, in this way a secured creditor’s claim cannot attach to the properly reclaimed 
goods.”). 
274. William J. Burnett & Colleen A. Garrity, Two New Judges, Two New Opinions: Too Bad for
503(b)(9) Suppliers, ABIWORLD.NET, (Mar. 2007), http://abiworld.net/newsletter/utc/vol5num1/Two 
NewOpinions.html. 
